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Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction
in Public Schools
A controversy is raging over public school instruction in the origin
of the universe and life. Just as many individuals have complained
about school curricula that required instruction only in divine crea-
tion,' many individuals now object to curricula that involve instruc-
tion exclusively in the general theory of evolution.2
The debate has given rise to much activity.3 In California the state
board of education incorporated a creationist theory of the inception
1. See, e.g., Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn.
105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
2. The general theory declares "that all the living forms in the world have arisen
from a single source which itself came from an inorganic form." G. KERKUT, IMPLICATIONS
OF EVOLUTION 157 (1960). In considering this controversy, the "general" theory of evolu-
tion must be distinguished from the "special" or "limited" theory, which "states that
many living animals can be observed over the course of time to undergo changes" through
genetic variation and limited mutation. id.
3. Recent litigation has challenged exclusive instruction in the general theory. Wil-
loughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. May 18, 1973), aff'd mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366
F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974). Numerous complaints against exclusive presentation of that theory
have been filed with district and state boards of education. See, e.g., J. HEFLEY, TEXT-
BOO ON TRIAL 43-51, 70-75 (1976) (describing parent and student complaints in Texas).
Legislation requiring comparable attention to the general theory and a model of creation
has been proposed in several states. E.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1973, 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1364,
reprinted in Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 1975) (requiring that com-
mensurate classroom attention be given to Genesis account of creation and to treatment of
general theory); Acts & Facts, July-Aug. 1975, at i-iv (Institute for Creation Research Im-
pact Ser. No. 26) ("Resolution for Equitable Treatment of Both Creation and Evolution")
(recommending parallel presentation of scientific creationist model, not involving use of
any sacred text, along with general theory). Articles debating the issue have been
published in scientific journals. Compare, e.g., Gish, A Challenge to Neo-Darwinism, 32
AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 495 (1970) (presenting scientific creationist viewpoint) and Gish,
Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence, 35 Am. BIOLOGY TCHR. 132 (1973) (same)
with Aulie, The Doctrine of Special Creation (pts. 1-2), 34 AM. BIOLOGY TCaR. 191, 261
(1972) (criticizing creationism) and Newell, Evolution under Attack, NAT. HIST., Apr.
1974, at 32 (same). And resolutions have been adopted in opposition to presentation of
scientific creationism. E.g., A Statement Affirming Evolution as a Principle of Science,
HUMANISr, Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 4 (resolution published by American Humanist Association
urging school boards, teachers, and textbook publishers to "[r]esist and oppose measures
currently before several state legislatures that would require creationist views of origins
be given equal treatment and emphasis in public-school biology classes and text ma-
terials").
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of the earth and living forms into the public school science guidelines,4
added publications espousing that concept to the approved textbook
list, and almost required presentation of a model of creation along with
the general theory of evolution.5 Although the board later removed
the creationist model from the science guidelines, it currently recom-
mends presentation of that viewpoint in conjunction with other con-
cepts in social studies classes that discuss the subject of origins.6 A
similar controversy is under way in Indiana, where the state textbook
commission added to the approved list a book that presents both the
general theory and a creationist model. 7 In several states, educational
authorities have restricted exclusive presentation of the general theory8
4. The California Board of Education issued a statement of policy, in May 1969, that
"tilf the origins of man were taught from the point of view of both evolutionists and
creationists, the purpose of education would be satisfied." J.A. Moore, Creationism in Cali-
fornia, DAEDALUS, Summer 1974, at 173, 177. It then added two paragraphs to the state
science framework, in November 1969, which stated that "scientific evidence to date
concerning the origin of life implies . . . the necessity to use several theories," as in
"other scientific disciplines, such as the physics of light." Although some religions adhere
to special creation, "science has independently postulated the various theories of creation,"
so that "creation in scientific terms is not a religious or philosophic belief." Id. at 178.
5. The board tentatively adopted several scientific creationist texts for elementary
school use in May 1972. It then held public hearings on the question of instruction in
origins in which both scientists and religious groups testified on each side of the issue in
November 1972. Id. at 180-81. A vote to provide equal treatment of the two models in
textbooks narrowly failed by five ballots to three (six being necessary for passage) in
December 1972. The board adopted a requirement for presentation of evolution as
"theory" rather than as "scientific dogmatism" at that meeting, and, in February 1973,
established guidelines for social science textbooks to include creationism along with the
general theory in discussing origins. Science and the Citizen: Creation Compromised,
SCIENTIFIC Amt., Feb. 1973, at 46-47; J.A. Moore, supra note 4, at 183-84.
6. J.A. Moore, supra note 4, at 184. The board recommended that, because presentation
of only the general theory might force some individuals "to choose between their system of
belief and the evolutionary explanations," several viewpoints of human origin should be
discussed "as part of the intellectual and cultural diversity of our society" examined in
social studies courses. CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., SOCIAL SCIENCES EDUCATIONAL
FRAMEWORK 38 (1975); Memorandum from Sup't of Pub. Instruction, Instruction to
County and District Superintendents and School Principals (Feb. 26, 1976) (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
7. The Indiana commission on December 12, 1975 added this biology textbook to
the seven-book list from which school districts may select, and after a hearing upheld that
action on March 18, 1977. Commission on Textbook Adoption (Mar. 18, 1977) (on file
with Yale Law Journal). The state superior court held use of this book to violate the
establishment clause of the First Amendment. Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139
(Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977), excerpted in 45 U.S.L.W. 2530 (May 17, 1977).
8. Three large school districts have adopted the policy that creation be presented along
with the general theory: Dallas, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; and Kanawha County, West
Virginia. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 3; Board of Educ., Dallas Independent
School Dist., Balanced Treatment of Creation Theories (Jan. 26, 1977) (on file with
Yale Law Journal); Board of Educ., City Schools of Columbus, Policy Statement No.
71-8-83 (Spring 1971) (on "Teaching of Creation and Evolution Theories of Origins") (on
file with Yale Law Journal); Letter from John F. Santrock, Jr., Superintendent of
Kanawha County Schools (Nov. 25, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Two states,
Arizona and Oregon, urge comparable attention to these perspectives, although they do
not formally require it. ARIZONA DEP'T OF EDUC., WHAT EVERY CHILD SHOULD KNOW . . .
SCIENCE: COURSE OF STUDY CRITERIA FOR TExTBOOK SELECTION 18 (June 1973); State Dep't
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and have approved textbooks containing a model of creation.9
Leading advocates of the creationist perspective do not endeavor to
proscribe discussion of the general theory of evolution,' 0 as did the
law involved in the Scopes trial." Nor in most areas do they attempt
to introduce biblical creation into public schools. Instead they support
"scientific creationism," a theory of the origin of the earth and life
that employs scientific argument and not a sacred text in its challenge
to the general theory.'12 Cast in this form, the conflict is not between
science and religion, but between two theoretical models that build
upon scientific observation and criticism' 3 and that harmonize with
some religions and have overtones contrary to others.' 4
of Educ., Guiding Statements on the Teaching of the Origin of Life in Oregon Ele-
mentary-Secondary Schools (Dec. 18, 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Two other
states, Texas and California, compel presentation of the general theory of evolution as
theory rather than fact. Texas Educ. Agency, Policies of the Texas State Bd. of Educ.
Series 3331.3(5) (undated) ("textbooks that treat the theory of evolution should identify it
as only one of several explanations of the origins of humankind," and must approach
the general theory as "theoretical rather than factually verifiable"); see note 5 supra
(California).
9. State textbook commissions in five states have added to the approved list general
texts or supplementary texts that present a model of creation. INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS
SECTION, GEORGIA DEP'T OF Enuc., THE GEORGIA TEXTBOOK LIST 1977, at 163, 182 (1977);
Idaho State Dep't of Educ., Textbook Adoptions 1976 addendum at III (Feb. 1976) (on
file with Yale Law Journal); Commission on Textbook Adoption, Indiana State Bd. of
Educ., Textbook Adoption: Science/Health & Safety 19 (Dec. 12, 1975) (on file with Yale
Law Journal); TEXTBOOK SECTION, OKLAHOMA DEP'T OF EDUc., ANNUAL TEXTBOOK REQ-
UISITION 1976-1977, at 100; STATE TExTBOOK COMM'N, TENNESSEE OFFICIAL LIsr OF TEXT-
BooKS 48 (1976). The creationist texts on these lists are discussed in note 197 infra. School
districts in at least three other states currently use textbooks containing the creationist
approach to the origin of the universe and life. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1977, § 1, at 10, col.
3 (Texas); Acts & Facts, Dec. 1976, at 1-2 (Institute for Creation Research) (Ohio); see R.
BLISs, ORIGINS iii (1976) (Wisconsin).
10. Wade, Creationists and Evolutionists: Confrontation in California, 178 Sc. 724,
725 (1972) ("The creationists, although they personally do not believe that evolution
occurred, are not asking that Darwin be evicted from the classroom.")
11. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
12. Wade, supra note 10, at 725-26 ("Nor, as they are sometimes accused of doing, are
[creationists] trying to put Genesis into the biology books .... Their assertion is that the
facts and subject matter explained by the theory of evolution can equally well be ex-
plained by a theory of creation .... ") The foremost advocate of scientific creationism
"encourage/s] a careful and objective study of both concepts of origins, on a scientific
level only, in the public schools." H. Morris, Introducing Scientific Creationism into the
Public Schools 1 (Institute for Creation Research 1975).
13. See pp. 554-61 infra. The foremost proponents of scientific creationism are
scientists. The Creation Research Society, an association of scientific creationists, has
approximately 500 members who hold advanced degrees in the natural sciences. BIoLoGY:
A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY xxii (rev. ed. J.N. Moore & H. Slusher 1974). The
Newton Scientific Association is a similar British group. The authors of creationist text-
books in general hold doctorates in science, and many teach at nonreligious universities.
See note 198 infra.
14. Much support for the general theory is religious. The late Sir Julian Huxley
provides a prominent example, in his advocacy of the "religion of evolutionary human-
ism," and the "Religious Humanism" movement provides another. See notes 206 & 211
infra.
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The controversy over science instruction in public schools raises
difficult constitutional issues under the First Amendment: whether
exclusive presentation of the general theory of evolution in public
school classes burdens free exercise of creationist religions, whether the
peculiar characteristics of public schools make this burden substantial,
whether the governmental interest in presentation of the general theory
justifies the restraint on religious freedom, and whether available
methods of relief would violate the First Amendment prohibition
against establishment of religion. Because of the limited development
of constitutional doctrine under the religion clauses and the obscure
grounds for many of the decisions, no case directly settles these First
Amendment issues. This Note's analysis, therefore, will rely upon
inference from precedent and the purpose of the First Amendment.
The Note will argue that exclusive public school instruction in the
general theory of evolution, at the secondary and elementary levels,
abridges free exercise of religion. 15 After considering the burden on
the individual's religious exercise and the state interest in school cur-
ricula, the Note will discuss several alternative approaches to relief
that are available to states or school districts.
I. Abridgment of Religious Exercise by Public School Instruction in
the Origin of the World and Life
The First Amendment prohibits the state from abridging free ex-
ercise of religion.' 6 Although the meaning of this restriction has never
been clearly articulated, abridgment of religious exercise 7 in fact oc-
curs only when there is contrariety between a governmental program or
requirement and religious exercise, a burden upon that religious
exercise, and an absence of a compelling state interest that justifies the
burden.18
15. This analysis applies only to public secondary and elementary schools, not to
colleges or nonpublic schools. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). It applies, moreover, only to schools that
teach the general theory of evolution and not to public schools teaching only the limited
theory and other biological concepts.
This Note does not discuss the contention that unneutral instruction in the general
theory of evolution is an establishment of religion.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....")
17. The free exercise clause protects practices and convictions that are based on
considerations tantamount to religious principles, held in sincerity by the individual,
and comprehended in a bona fide religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78.
86 (1944); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1968).
18. This analytic approach can be seen in recent free exercise cases. E.g., Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (contrariety of Amish precepts to formal secular educa-
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A. Contrariety to Religious Tenets
To provide a foundation for abridgment of free exercise, contrariety
between governmental action and religious precepts must be present.'9
A comparison of the tenets of some religious faiths to the explanation
in public school textbooks of the origin of the universe and life in-
dicates the contrariety between religious doctrines of creation and the
general theory of evolution.20
Many individuals adhere to religions that affirm divine creation as
a cardinal tenet of faith. Creationist religions, which are both numerous
and theologically diverse, include the Church of Christ, Independent
Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Orthodox Jews,21 and many Lutherans,
tion beyond eighth grade); id. at 215, 217-18 (encroachment of compulsory attendance on
beliefs and practices); id. at 218 (compulsion of objectionable conduct and values); id. at
215 (absence of a compelling state interest not otherwise served); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 399 (1963) (opposition of religious scruples to Saturday work); id. at 403
(burden on free exercise); id. at 405-06 (deterrence and penalization of constitutional
liberties); id. at 406, 407 (nonexistence of a compelling state interest and availability of
less intrusive alternatives). See Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A
Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 278-80. Other foundational principles for free
exercise have been proposed by various commentators. See, e.g., P. KAUPER, RE UGION AND
THE CoNsTrrrTUoN 13 (1964) ("purpose of the constitutional system . . . to protect and
promote religious liberty"); P. KuRLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962) (no "classifica-
tion in terms of religion"); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967) ("balancing" of public interest against
religious interest).
19. The religion of the individual, not the viewpoint of the majority or the perception
of the court, determines the contrariety of religious exercise to governmental action.
Courts do not assess the reasonableness or verity of the tenets of a bona fide religion
sincerely held. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1944). They accept the
religion's affirmations of its precepts and oppositions to other views, because free
exercise includes the right to define both what religious conviction embraces and what
it opposes. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943) (accepting
students' religious scruples against flag pledge and salute, and their characterization as
worship of a graven image); cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 715 (1977) (adopt-
ing petitioner's characterization of displaying state license motto "Live Free or Die" as
ideological in nature and contrary to religious convictions).
20. One federal district court, in Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F.
Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afJ'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974), denied this contrariety. It asserted that "the offending material [in
textbooks exclusively presenting the general theory] is peripheral to the matter of
religion." Id. at 1211. See note 61 infra. Similarly, the producer of three major high
school textbooks has claimed that biology texts "do not challenge or contradict religious
principles" and "[s]cience is neutral with regard to the theological implications arising
out of scientific investigation." Mayer, The Nineteenth Century Revisited, BSCS NEws-
LETER, Nov. 1972, at 7, 8, 12. Nevertheless, the following discussion shows creationist
beliefs, regardless of their truth or falsity, to be entirely contrary to the general theory.
21. For example, the Seventh-day Adventist Church (495,699 members) believes that
"creation ... is affirmed in the Scriptures to be an immediate act that produced a wide
variety of living forms virtually instantaneously." H. COFFIN, CREATION: ACCIDENT OR
DEsIGN? 399 (1969). It teaches that "God created the varied forms of plant and animal
life on successive days of creation week," including Adam, and "[t]he sun, the planets,
and their satellites" at once. Id. at 21, 39, 40. Subsequently, "Noah and his family were
saved by miraculous preservation in the ark" from divine judgment by "a universal
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Pentecostals, and other faiths.2 2 The religious creationism affirmed
by these faiths teaches that God supernaturally created the earth and
life, that He directly formed all living kinds including Adam and
Eve, and that God sent a worldwide flood destroying all mankind ex-
cept Noah and his family. This doctrine ordinarily involves a literal
reading of Genesis, a relatively recent time for God's creative acts, and
a historical fall of the first human beings into sin.
2 3
flood." Id. at 75, 467. For Brethren, see V. Flint, Genesis 8, 9, 10 (undated) (unpublished
syllabus for Emmaus Bible School) (Plymouth Brethren; 70,000 members) (on file with
Yale Law Journal); J. WHITCOMB, THE EARLY EARTH 21 (1972) (Grace Brethren; 37,727).
For Church of Christ, see B. BAXTER, I BELIEVE BECAUSE . . . . at 123, 137, 167 (1971)
(2,400,000). For Independent Baptists, see Articles of Faith art. v. (undated) (Baptist Bible
Fellowship, 1,500,000; World Baptist Fellowship, 1,000,000); E. Gillentine, What We
Believe 5 (undated) (American Baptist Association; 1,071,000) (on file with Yale Law
Journal); General Association of Regular Baptist Churches, Constitution and Articles of
Faith 5 (1972) (250,000); BAPTIsT MISSIONARY ASSOCIATION, 1976 YEARBOOK 225 (215,788);
Southwide Baptist Fellowship, Directory 1972-73, at 2 (130,000); W. Rector, Orthodox
Baptist Confession of Faith 4 (1965) (Orthodox Baptist churches and other unaffiliated
Baptist churches; membership not available); Gospel Fellowship Association, Bylaws,
Preamble (1976) (10,000) ; New Testament Association of Independent Baptist Churches,
Directory 6 (1976) (5,000) (on file with Yale Law Journal). See also EXECUTIVE OFFICE Or
FREE WILL BAPTISTS, A TREATISE OF THE FAITH AND PRACTICE OF FREE WILL BAPTISTS 12,
13 (1974) (227,434). For Jehovah's Witnesses, see WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY,
DID MAN GET HERE BY EVOLUTION OR BY CREATION? 5, 50 (1967) (560,897). For Orthodox
Jews, see Shapiro, God, Man and Creation, TRADITION, Spring-Summer 1975, at 25, 26, 28,
29 (1,000,000). For membership statistics, see generally YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND
CANADIAN CHURCHES 233-39 (C. Jacquet ed. 1977) and materials on file with Yale Law
Journal.
22. For Lutherans, see Brief Statement of the Doctrinal Position of the Missouri
Synod 5 (1932) (2,763,545 members); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.N.H. 1974)
(Apostolic Lutheran Church; 9,384 members). For Methodists, see The Faith and Life of a
Free Methodist 8, 9 (L. Knox ed. 1976) (67,043); Southern Methodist Church, What, Why,
How? 15 (undated) (11,000) (on file with Yale Law Journal). For Pentecostals, see Assem-
blies of God, Proposed Position Paper Concerning the Doctrine of Creation 2, 4, 6 (Apr.
5, 1977) (1,239,197) (on file with Yale Law Journal); D. Bowdle, Redemption Accomplished
and Applied 21, 22, 27, 32 (undated) (Church of God, Cleveland, Tenn.; 343,249); Pente-
costal Church of God, General Constitution and By-Laws 12 (1975) (135,000). For Pres-
byterians, see Westminster Confession of Faith chs. iv, v (Orthodox Presbyterian Church,
14,781; Reformed Presbyterian Church, Evangelical Synod, 23,719); Christian Reformed
Church, Doctrinal Standards 7, 8 (1962) (287,503). For other faiths, see 68th General
Council, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Statement of Faith ir 5 (undated) (145,833); C.
Ryrie, We Believe in Creation 3 (1967) (Independent Fundamentalist Churches of
America; 129,313) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Mennonite General Conference,
Mennonite Confession of Faith 10-11 (1963) (Mennonite Church; 94,209).
Many individuals and churches within Mormonism, Roman Catholicism, and the
Southern Baptist religion affirm belief in special creation. For Mormons, see M.A. COOK
& M.G. COOK, SCIENCE AND MORMONISM 118, 120 (1967) (2,336,715 total members). For
Roman Catholics, see Pilus XII, Humani Generis iir 37, 38 (1950); P. Haigh, Thirty Theses
Against Theistic Evolution (1976) (Catholic Center for Creation Research) (48,881,872 total
members). For Southern Baptists, see Southern Baptist Convention, The Baptist Faith and
Message 10 (1963); Adam and Eve, Real or Imaginary: Creation vs Evolution, Southern
Baptist Journal, Jan. 1975, at 3 (12,733,124 total members).
For membership statistics, see generally YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
CHURCHES, supra note 21, at 233-39.
23. E.g., Articles of Faith, supra note 21 (Baptist Bible Fellowship) (Genesis "is to be
accepted literally, and not allegorically or figuratively"); J. WHITCOMB, supra note 21, at
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The general theory of evolution,24 as it is presented by the leading
biology textbooks in public secondary schools, 2a embraces several key
premises. It proposes origination of the universe and earth through
natural processes2-6 and naturalistic development of life from nonlife.2 7
The general theory involves evolution of present living forms from
this first organism through mutation and natural selection,28 and en-
22 (Grace Brethren) (Bible warns against "such fable[s]" as "that God . . . employed
natural processes . . . through vast periods of time" to create the world and life);
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, A Statement of Scriptural and Confessional Principles
art. v. (1973) (Adam and Eve's "fall was a historical occurrence") (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
24. For description of the general theory, see G. KRKuTr, supra note 2, at 6; note 2
supra.
25. The four most widely used high school biology textbooks are THE BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCE CURRICULUM STUDY, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE: MOLECULES TO MAN (3d ed. Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1976) [hereinafter cited as BSCS BLUE]; BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY,
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE: AN INQUIRY INTO LIFE (3d ed. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1973) [here-
inafter cited as BSCS YELLOW]; BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY, BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCE: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH (3d ed. Rand McNally Co. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
BSCS GREEN]; J. OTTO, A. TOWLE & M. MADNICK, MODERN BIOLOGY (Holt, Rinehart & Win-
ston 1977) [hereinafter cited as MODERN BIOLOGY]. BSCS texts are used by "more than 50
percent of the American high school students" studying biology, and "100 percent of them
are using materials that have been influenced by the BSCS, as publishers have followed
the curriculum study lead." Mayer, The BSCS Process of Curriculum Development, BSCS
NEWSLETrER, Sept. 1976, at 4, 8. See Hurd, An Exploratory Study of the Impact of BSCS
Secondary School Curriculum Materials, 38 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 79, 81 (1976); Leonard &-
Lowery, A Criterion for Biology Textbook Selection, 38 Am. BIOLOGY TCHR. 477, 478
(1976) (noting extensive use of Modern Biology). One particular area in which BSCS
texts have influenced all biology school texts is in thorough and integrated presentation
of the general theory of evolution. Mayer, supra at 8; see Grabiner & Miller, Effects of
the Scopes Trial, 185 Sct. 832 (1974).
26. E.g., BSCS YELLOW, supra note 25, at 834 ("[T]he stars and their planets gradually
condensed from a vast cloud of hydrogen .... "); BSCS BLUE, supra note 25, at 123
("[P]rotoplanets were formed ... from clouds of dust and gases that had been torn away
from the edges of the sun. . . . [T]he protoplanets merged to form the earth.") For
similar discussion, see BSCS YELLOW, supra note 25, at 702-03, 705, 834-35; MODERN BIOL-
OGY, supra note 25, at 253.
27. E.g., BSCS YELLOW, supra note 25, at 837 ("Amino acids could have combined to
form proteins." Then "self-organizing, self-reproducing blobs could have appeared" and
"[m]utations that produced new proteins . . . eventually must have occurred. Still other
mutations eventually led to cells .... "). For similar discussion, see BSCS BLUE, supra
note 25, at 106, 113, 116-21, 123-24, 134-42, 162-64, 168, 180, 182-83, 205, 213; BSCS
YELLOW, supra note 25, at 100, 196, 703-08, 786, 836-37; BSCS GREEN, supra note 25, at
277, 315-16, 396; MODERN BIOLOGY, supra note 25, at 149-50, 182.
28. E.g., BSCS YELLOW, supra note 25, at 714, 716, 719, 786, 787 ("We look today upon
all species as the products of a long evolution, going back to the origin of life itself."
Fins of fish "evolved into the paired legs of chordates that live on land," such as
amphibians. "[O]ne group of amphibians evolved into reptiles" and "the reptiles also
gave rise to another class of chordates, the mammals." Then "[r]oughly 60 million years
ago a mix of genes produced the Primates.") For similar discussions, see BSCS BLUE, supra
note 25, at 89-94, 96-102, 105-06, 162, 225, 231, 233, 235, 236-37, 255, 259, 261-64, 267, 272,
282, 306, 348-54, 359-60, 362-64, 365-70, 380, 383, 388, 395, 400, 405, 419, 423, 435, 447-49,
455, 468-69, 472, 477, 490, 493-94, 504, 508, 510, 511, 522-23, 736-37; BSCS YELLOW, supra
note 25, at 164, 179, 184, 190, 196-97, 207, 240-41, 250, 272, 287, 290, 293, 306, 312, 313,
319, 320, 326, 347, 414, 418, 423, 435, 519-20, 589-90, 605, 606, 686, 696-702, 708-25, 726-45,
746-62, 848, 862, 867-83; BSCS GREEN, supra note 25, at 138, 171, 317, 318-19, 320-27, 329-
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tails evolution of human beings from ancestry common with apes.20 It
also postulates uniformitarianism-the concept that past physical pro-
cesses acted much like present g-adual processes-as the underlying key
to the sequence of evolution and to the ages of the earth, life, fossils,
and man. 30 Comparison of these premises of the general theory with
the basic elements of the creation doctrine shows direct contradiction,31
a contradiction that has been recognized not only by adherents to
creation3r 2 but also by exponents of the general theory and by the
courts.3 3
31, 337-47, 400, 457, 469, 477, 524, 586-87, 605, 609-14, 616-23, 626-28, 632-36, 698; MODERN
BIOLOGY, supra note 25, at 150-61, 163-64, 252-53, 257, 260-61, 262, 264-66, 268, 272, 341,
367, 374, 412-13, 419, 421, 437-38, 441, 452, 454, 456-57, 458, 459, 465, 467, 468, 469, 471-
73, 486, 488, 490, 493, 496, 500, 503.
29. E.g., BSCS BLUE, supra note 25, at 382, 383-84 ("In the past hundred years, enough
fossil evidence of man's evolution has been unearthed to confirm Darwin's theory about
man's ancestry," that "[m]an shares a common ancestor with the modern apes.") For
similar discussion, see id. at 372, 374-75, 378-84, 494, 716-19; BSCS YELLOW, supra note 25,
at 722, 763-88, 789-805; BSCS GREEN, supra note 25, at 642, 649-53, 657, 661; MODERN
BIOLOGY, supra note 25, at 166-67, 516, 517-21.
30. E.g., BSCS GREEN, supra note 25, at 310 (Although "[s]ome people once thought"
that "fossils were the result of the Great Flood," geologists instead "concluded that fossils
are evidence of organisms that existed during past ages of the earth.") For similar dis-
cussion, see BSCS BLUE, supra note 25, at 90-92, 97; BSCS YEu Ow, supra note 25, at
728-29, 757; BSCS GREEN, supra note 25, at 305, 312, 333, 607.
31. The general theory states that matter has existed without beginning and that the
universe and earth reached their present forms by naturalistic processes, while the creation
viewpoint teaches that matter appeared through direct creation by God in the beginning
and that this creation occurred by supernatural plan. The former explanation asserts that
life developed from nonlife and that present living forms including man evolved from
those lower forms, whereas the latter declares that God created life from nothing and
that He by direct act made living kinds including Adam and Eve. The one holds to a
uniformitarian explanation of history and the antiquity of the earth and life, while the
other involves the occurrence of a universal flood and a recent creation of the world and
living kinds.
32. For example, the Assemblies of God believe that "Creation thus rules out the
evolutionary philosophy which states that all forms of life have come into being by
gradual, progressive evolution," and also "rules out any evolutionary origin for man."
Assemblies of God, supra note 22, at 4. Accord, e.g., WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACr SocIETy,
supra note 21, at 5; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, supra note 23, at art. v.
Creationists often assert that the general theory eviscerates not only essential religious
tenets such as the creation of the earth and man or occurrence of the fall and flood, but
also the very existence of God and the divine inspiration of scripture. E.g., H. COFFIN,
supra note 21, at 456-57 (Seventh-day Adventists express concern that the "books [an
elementary school student] studies describe the origin of matter and life, and the sub-
sequent development of animals and plants in a way much different from what he learned
in Sunday school." Then in "high school science . . . classes the theory of evolution is
presented in greater detail and as unquestionable fact." Consequently he "enters his
career, strongly satisfied that . . . evolution is an undeniable fact . . . . Slowly, uncon-
sciously perhaps, faith in God and His Word has given way to faith in a theory."); WArcH
TowER BIBLE & TRACT SocIErY, supra note 21, at 127 (Jehovah's Witnesses).
33. Sir Julian Huxley noted that "[i]n the evolutionary pattern of thought there is no
longer either need or room for the supernatural. The earth was not created; it evolved."
Huxley, The Evolutionary Vision, in 3 EVOLUTION AFrER DARWIN 249, 252 (S. Tax & C.
Callender eds. 1960). See At Random, in id. at 41, 45-46 ("Darwinism removed the whole
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B. Burden on Religious Exercise
For contrariety between religious belief and state programs to
provide a basis for abridgment of free exercise, a burden on religious
liberty-actual interference with religious exercise-must be shown.
Three types of burdens on free exercise can arise in the public school
classroom: undermining of religious convictions, violation of religious
practices, and compulsion of unconscionable declarations of belief.
These burdens can interfere with religious exercise because of certain
coercive features of public education: requirements of the academic
program, conditions on enjoyment of public school instruction, and
influence of teachers and peers.
1. Types of Restraints on Free Exercise in Public Schools
a. Undermining of Creationist Beliefs
Subjection of students in public schools to an academic program
contrary to religious convictions may burden free exercise by under-
mining belief in essential religious tenets and by inducing belief in
incompatible views. Although courts have not dealt with restraint on
religious belief entirely apart from that on conduct, they have con-
sidered interference with both belief and practice.34 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, for example, held that a compulsory education law
abridged free exercise of the Amish religion.35 Besides infringement
idea of God as the creator" because natural selection left "no room for a supernatural
agency"); Thompson, Introduction to C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES at xxiii (1956)
(general theory is "opposed" to the "Christian concept of the universe"). Justice Black
also recognized the antagonism between the general theory and creationist religions. Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968) (concurring opinion).
34. Through the years the Supreme Court has recognized that religious beliefs are
inviolable, even though religious practices often may be regulated. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[I'he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be."); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOMi OF EXPRESSION 22 (1970)
("holding of a belief is afforded complete protection" under First Amendment, a
proposition "accepted consistently and without hesitation by all courts and commenta-
tors"). Because belief and action ordinarily are inseparable, the courts have abandoned
the sharp distinction formerly employed to deny protection to some religiously motivated
conduct. Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) with Marcus, The
Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J.
1217, 1233-35 and P. KURLAND, supra note 18, at 22. This inseparability is evident in
public school classrooms, since any impact on religious values from teachers or curricula
occurs in the context of compelled student conduct such as attendance at the school,
obedience to the faculty, and attention to the subject presented. See Schempp v. Abington
School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 406, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1959), vacated and remanded, 364 U.S.
298 (1960), on remand, 195 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
35. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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through compulsion of "affirmative acts which are repugnant to [the
students'] religion," the court found infringement through the "im-
pact" of "secondary school values [that] will make life as Amish im-
possible. ' 36 Affirming this decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 7 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the statute "contravene[d] the
basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith."38 It noted that
the Amish faith involves a religious way of life that embodies not only
theocentric community conduct and separatist practices but also doc-
trinal tenets and sectarian values,3 9 and that the students' free exercise
claim involved both religious belief and religious conduct. 40 The
opinion emphasized the impact of compulsory education on religious
convictions as well as on practices, 41 and indicated that the educational
requirement undermined beliefs of Amish students in addition to com-
pelling actions contrary to that religion.42
b. Violation of Separatist Practices
Subjection of students in public schools to classroom instruction that
is predominantly adverse to their religious convictions may also burden
religious liberty by violating free exercise of separatist practices. Many
religions require that their adherents be separate from teachings and
practices that conflict with religious tenets. A few faiths are absolute
in their insistence on separatist practices and forbid any exposure to
contrary belief. 43 A large number of religious groups are more
36. 49 Wis. 2d at 437, 438, 182 N.W.2d at 542.
37. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 210-11, 216, 219, 235. The Amish oppose public school education beyond
eighth grade because both removal from their community and the effect of the school
curriculum and environment impede this religious way of life. Id. at 211, 217.
40. Id. at 220 ("[I]n this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-
tight compartments.")
41. Id. at 211 ("Formal high school education . . . places Amish children in an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs . . . [and] takes them away from their community
...."); id. at 210-11 ("[T]he values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values
and the Amish way of life ...."); id. at 212, 216, 219, 235.
42. Id. at 212 ("In the Amish belief higher learning tends to develop values they
reject as influences that alienate man from God," while elementary school education,
which they accept, "does not significantly expose their children to worldly values or
interfere with their development in the Amish community .... "); id. at 211, 211-12, 218;
Note, The Amish Exemption: A Constitutionally Compelled Exception?, 34 U. Prrr. L.
R v. 274, 274-75 (1972).
43. An example of absolute separatism is the Apostolic Lutheran faith. It forbids ad-
herents to "watch movies, watch television, view audio-visual projections, listen to the
radio, engage in play acting, sing or dance to worldly music, study evolution, study
'humanist' philosophy, partake in sexually oriented teaching programs, openly discuss
personal and family matters, and receive the advice of secular guidance counselors." Davis
v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.N.H. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
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moderate in this practice; they oppose subjection to views biased
against their beliefs, but permit participation in a balanced presenta-
tion of both antagonistic and supportive teachings in a nonreligious
forum, such as a public school classroom.44 Many other faiths are not
explicitly separatists, yet would presumably protest beyond a point
against submission to particularly hostile views.
The courts have recognized that separatist practices fall within free
exercise protection. The Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, recently
invalidated an educational standards law that burdened a sectarian
school's exercise of separatist religious tenets. 45 The courts also have
recognized that school curricula antagonistic to religious convictions
can violate exercise of separatist practices. In Yoder the Supreme Court
implicitly acknowledged that public schools abridged separatist prac-
tices integral to the Amish way of life. The Old Order Amish faith
requires separation of the absolute type, 46 and compulsory education
after eighth grade exposed Amish students both to an environment
antagonistic to their values and to teachings contrary to their doc-
trines.47
c. Compulsion of Unconscionable Declarations of Belief
Compulsion of declarations of belief contrary to the religious con-
victions held by public school students may burden free exercise of
44. Typical of this more common practice of separatism is the Baptist Bible Fellow-
ship. The "Fellowship believes in separation. Its churches and members literally follow
commands in the Bible such as 'be ye separate (from unbelief), saith the Lord' . . . ;
'have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness' ... ; and avoid 'oppositions of
science falsely so called.'" While "in religious matters the Baptist Bible Fellowship
believes in total separation from unbelief in any form, in secular matters it believes in
separation from many activities and teachings" but also "recognizes that Christians must
be in the world though not of it." Letter from Dr. R. Herbert Fitzpatrick, Trustee of
Baptist Bible College (Sept. 27, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
45. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). The minimum stan-
dards law "infringe[d] upon the rights of these appellants, consistent with their religious
beliefs, to engage in complete, or nearly complete, separation from community affairs"
through avoiding conformity to the world's values and beliefs. Id. at 209-10, 351 N.E.2d
at 767. Practice of "separation from worldliness" impelled the appellants to center educa-
tion around Bible study. Id. at 188, 199, 351 N.E.2d at 755, 761. The challenged state
statute interfered with this practice through allocation of most of the school day to
secular subjects. Id. at 205, 210, 351 N.E.2d at 765-66, 771.
46. The Court noted strict Amish adherence to biblical injunctions such as "be not
conformed to this world." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). "Separation from
the world is a basic tenet of the Amish charter . J. HosmaaE_., AMIsH SociEaY 51
(rev. ed. 1968). See id. at 48, 49.
47. 406 U.S. at 218 ("The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by ex-
posing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values con-
trary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child and his integration into the way of life . . . contravenes the basic religious
tenets and practice of the Amish faith .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 211.
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religion by causing subordination of those convictions. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4s the Supreme Court
ruled that the First Amendment protects individuals from state-com-
pelled statements contrary to religious principles. 40 The religion of
the students in that case forbade reciting the pledge of allegiance and
saluting the flag. 50 The required declaration abridged the First Amend-
ment rights of the students, not because it was an oath5' or because it
was religious in nature,5 2 but because it offended the complainants'
religious convictions.53
2. Coercion against Free Exercise in Public Schools
For any of the above restraints on religious liberty to be substantial,
and hence to contribute to an abridgment of free exercise, coercion
against free exercise must be exerted.5 4 This pressure can take two basic
forms: the state might force an individual to choose between sub-
ordinating a religious exercise and suffering a penalty or to choose
48. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
49. Id. at 633-34 ("T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind .... To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required
to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind,
left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."); see
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 715 (1977) (First Amendment safeguards in-
dividual's "right to refrain from speaking" an "ideological point of view he finds sin-
acceptable" on religious grounds). Both cases were decided under "the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control" rather than specifically under the free exercise clause. 319 U.S.
at 642; 430 U.S. at 715. This general ideological sphere, however, appears to embrace not
only freedom of speech but also freedom of religion and freedom of press. Moreover, the
claims in the complaints under the free exercise clause indicate that the Court's reasoning
would apply to the religion area as well as the speech context. Compare Barnette v.
West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp 251, 253 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S 624
(1943) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) and
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (Murphy, J., concurring).
50. The Jehovah's Witness religion perceives the pledge and salute to be worship of a
graven image. 319 U.S. at 629.
51. The Court spoke of forcing an individual to declare, communicate, affirm, utter,
profess, or confess, and not of compelling him to swear or make an oath. 319 U.S. at 631,
633, 634, 642. Displaying a state motto clearly does not involve an oath or legal affirma-
tion, yet it abridged First Amendment rights because it forced the complainant to declare
an objectionable ideological point of view. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
52. The pledge of allegiance at that time did not contain the words "under God." See
319 U.S. at 628-29.
53. The Supreme Court has ruled that the state may not force an individual to profess
belief or disbelief in any religion. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). In Torcaso the Court overturned a law requiring
an oath of belief in God as a qualification for state office, because the oath compelled
an atheist to profess a belief contrary to his convictions. 367 U.S. at 495. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 288-89
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
248-49 (1968).
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between forsaking such an exercise and forgoing a public benefit.
Government need not impose the choice directly upon a named reli-
gion, but instead may require or prohibit something contrary to the
exercise of that religion.5 Students at the secondary and elementary
levels are especially susceptible to such pressures and to religious doubt,
because they do not weigh classroom instruction analytically56 and do
not approach religious issues abstractly. 57
Courts on two occasions have determined that exclusive instruction
in the general theory does not yield coercion against religious exercise,
and so have dismissed challenges under the free exercise clause without
trial. In Willoughby v. Stever 58 the plaintiff did "not allege any
coercion directed at the practice or exercise of his beliefs,"' 9 and in
55. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
56. Marek & Renner, Operational Thinking and the Tenth-Grade Student, ScI. TCHR.,
Sept. 1972, at 32 ("73 percent of the tenth-graders interviewed cannot do formal opera-
tional thinking," i.e., critical or analytical thinking, as in biology course) (high school
sophomores).
57. E.g., R. GOLDMAN, RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 239
(1964) (conceptual thought about religious questions does not reach full development
during adolescence); K. HYDE, RELIGIOUs LEARNING IN ADOLESCENCE 104 (1965) ("T]he
growth of a critical attitude in adolescence . . . inhibits the growth of true religious
attitude and of mature religious beliefs."); A. VERGOTE, THE RELIGIOUS MAN: A Psy-
CHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGIOUS ATrITUDES 297, 298 (M. Said trans. 1969) ("[A]dolescence
is the age of doubts about faith" since an individual then must "make his own critical
synthesis of life," which "leads him to reconsider his religious convictions.") Hence
public school instruction contrary to religious values can cause prejudice against religion.
E.g., R. GOLDMAN, supra at 242 ("many adolescents jettison their theological framework as
childish . . . because it cannot apparently be reconciled with science"); E. HURLOCK, CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 357, 360 (1942) (one major cause of "adolescent doubt" and "discarding of
• . . beliefs" is "the disturbing influence that comes from the study of science" that
contradicts religious beliefs (emphasis in original)); K. HYDE, supra at 92 ("[C]ritical
powers may be emotionally orientated against religious beliefs, while the assertions of a
popular humanism, with its mechanical explanation of life and its rejection of the
spiritual, is uncritically accepted. Thus a prejudice against religion becomes firmly
established while religious ideas remain confused and inadequate.")
58. No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. May 18, 1973), aff'd mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
59. Memorandum and Order at 6, id. (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972) (denying request for
three-judge court). Since apparently neither the plaintiff nor his child was exposed to
instruction in the general theory, the only pressure alleged was being "coerced to pay
taxes to support anti-religious acts which run contrary to his belief that man was created
by God." Id. See Respondents' Memorandum for Certiorari at 3-4, Willoughby v. Stever,
420 U.S. 927 (1975). This did not involve sufficient coercion to support a free exercise
claim. Cf. Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 94, 96 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd mem.,
530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975) (public school textbooks cause no "inhibition on or prohibi-
tion of the free exercise of religion" by private school student).
In Willoughby the plaintiff challenged federal funding of the National Science Founda-
tion, which in part finances textbook writing for secondary schools by the Biological
Sciences Curriculum Study. The suit was brought primarily under the establishment
clause. See Petition for Certiorari at 7, Willoughby v. Stever, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). The
district court refused to permit discovery and declined to hold a trial on the merits; it
dismissed the suit without opinion for lack of a substantial constitutional question. Peti-
tion for Certiorari at 4, id.
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Wright v. Houston Independent School District° "the offending ma-
terial [was] peripheral to the matter of religion" and required " 'obtuse
reasoning to inject any issue of the "free exercise" of religion.' "61
These decisions, however, failed to recognize the coercion against reli-
gious exercise that arises in public schools from prescribed courses,
conditioned benefits, teacher influence, and peer group persuasion, or
the susceptibility of students to these pressures against religious impera-
tives.
a. Compulsion through Course Prescription
Public schools may impose coercion at several levels. Students are
required to attend classes and may be required to study particular
subjects. If course material contradicts the religious convictions of
some students, prescription of the course threatens to undermine their
beliefs. If their religion forbids exposure to predominantly contrary
teachings, prescription also causes violation of religious practices. This
would impose a choice between abandoning free exercise or suffering
the penalty for not fulfilling a prerequisite for graduation and not
attending a required course.
b. Penalization by Unconstitutional Condition
Even where courses are not prescribed and attendance is not com-
pelled, a condition on valuable instruction may produce pressure
60. 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
61. 366 F. Supp. at 1211, 1212 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952)).
The district court in Wright responded to two free exercise arguments. First, there "has
been no suggestion that Plaintiffs, or any other students, have been denied the opportu-
nity to challenge their teachers' presentation of the Darwinian theory." 366 F. Supp. at
1210. The opportunity to respond, however, would not avert undermining of creationist
convictions in impressionable students, probably would not counter violation of separatist
practices from classroom instruction still antagonistic to religious exercise, and would not
necessarily render declarations on tests unnecessary. This "opportunity," moreover, does
not consider the substantial pressures from teachers and students against nonconforming
beliefs, particularly when those convictions must be stated publicly. Second, the plaintiffs
asserted that a request for exemption from class "compels a student 'to profess a belief'
in a religion." 366 F. Supp. at 1212. Although exemption ordinarily requires a request,
the request itself is not a declaration of belief or disbelief of the sort involved in
Barnette and Torcaso, so the district court properly distinguished those cases from a
request for exemption from a biology classroom or a decision of nonparticipation in a
released-time program (as in Zorach). Id.
In. Wright the plaintiffs challenged public school instruction in evolution, a "doctrine
that is religious in nature under the guise of scientific theory," primarily under the
establishment clause. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motions at
1, Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972). The
district court quashed the taking of depositions intended to provide proof of contrariety
and coercive impact. 366 F. Supp. at 1208 n.l; Petition for Certiorari at 7-8, 10, 46, Brown
v. Houston Independent School Dist., 417 U.S. 969 (1974). The court then dismissed the
suit for failure to state a substantial federal claim. 366 F. Supp. at 1212, 1213. Neither
Wright nor Willoughby involved a trial on the merits of the questions involved.
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against religious exercises. The unconstitutional condition doctrine
prohibits government from imposing a choice between enjoyment of
an important public benefit or privilege and assertion of fundamental
constitutional rights. 2 Such a choice necessarily produces coercion
against exercise of that right,63 whether it is enjoyment of religious
freedom, 4 exercise of free speech, 3 or another basic constitutional
right.6
A condition must meet several tests to be declared an unconstitu-
tional violation of religious freedom. First, a particular course of ac-
tion must burden free exercise of religion.67 Second, the free exercise
clause must bar government from directly requiring that course of
62. Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144,
144 (1968) (government "may not grant the benefit or privilege on conditions requiring
the recipient in some manner to relinquish his constitutional rights," nor can it "withhold
or cancel the benefit as a price for the assertion of such rights" (footnote omitted)). See
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n,
271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
The state may not condition receipt of a public benefit upon subordination of free
exercise rights or penalize the exercise of religious freedom by relinquishment of a
public benefit. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that the state may not condition receipt of unemployment compensation
benefits on subordination of sabbatarian (Saturday worship) convictions. Id. at 406. An
eligibility rule for welfare required acceptance of any available employment, id. at 400-01,
including jobs involving Saturday work, and Mrs. Sherbert's religion forbade labor on that
day. Id. at 399. Consequently the government "force[d] her to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." Id. at 404.
The Court thus deemed this to be an unconstitutional choice.
63. E.g., Comment, supra note 62, at 158 (state "encourag[es] him to forego exercise
of his rights" and creates "strong pressure to accept the benefit"); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595, 1599 (1960) ("Denying a benefit because of the exercise
of a right in effect penalizes that exercise. ... )
64. In Sherbert the choice pressured the individual to forgo a religious practice,
penalized free exercise of her religion, and constrained her to abandon a religious con-
viction. 374 U.S. at 404, 406, 410. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), a choice
between a declaration of belief contrary to religious convictions and enjoyment of public
office unconstitutionally forced a job applicant to profess belief contrary to his religious
convictions. Id. at 495.
65. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (choice between tax exemp-
tion and loyalty oath causes "deterrence of speech"); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) ("Under some circumstances, indirect 'discouragements'
undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.")
66. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (making death penalty
possible in jury trial but not in nonjury trial inevitably acts "to discourage assertion of
the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to demand a jury trial"); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) ("The
threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and
of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege"
against self-incrimination.)
67. The Court in Sherbert found that "the disqualification for benefits impose[d] [a]
burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion." 374 U.S. at 403.
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action. 68 Third, the state must have imposed a choice between the
protected religious exercise and a public benefit.69 Finally, imposition
of the choice, whether through a specific provision that disqualifies
adherents to the religion or through a condition that offends exercise
of their religion,70 must be effectively the same as requiring the un-
conscionable course of action."
A choice between deprivation of valuable instruction in public
schools and subordination of religious objections against curriculum
may produce coercion against free exercise. 72 Public education is a
68. In Sherbert the state could not directly require Saturday work. Id. ("no conduct
prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation"). See
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (federal government cannot deny right
to jury trial in a criminal case, so it cannot impose condition penalizing assertion of that
right); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (imposition of choice between tax
exemption and freedom of speech "produce[d] a result which the State could not com-
mand directly").
69. The Court in Sherbert noted that "forc[ing] her to choose between following...
her religion and forfeiting benefits" constituted "[g]overnmental imposition" of an un-
constitutional condition. 374 U.S. at 404.
70. For example, the choice involved in Sherbert was unconstitutional even though
the sabbatarian tenets of Mrs. Sherbert rather than a state disqualification of Seventh-day
Adventists forced her to surrender the benefit in order to assert free exercise rights. See
374 U.S. at 404 (Mrs. Sherbert's "ineligibility for benefits derive[d] solely from the
practice of her religion," yet choice was imposed by government). The dissent in that
case argued that the claimant "was denied benefits just as any other claimant would be
denied benefits who was not 'available for work' for personal reasons." Id. at 420
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Because it was irrelevant that "these personal
considerations sprang from her religious convictions," the state did not "discriminat[e]
against the appellant on the basis of her religious beliefs." Id. This nonetheless would
burden the free exercise of the objecting individual but not that of others. Although
the government might argue that "the condition or 'burden' applies to all recipients,"
actually "everyone is not being offered the same [benefit-burden] package, since the
condition serves as a significant restriction on the activities only of those who presently
desire to exercise the right required to be waived as the condition to receipt of the
benefit." Note, supra note 63, at 1600. The unconstitutional condition doctrine prevents
the state from accomplishing indirectly what it cannot do directly. Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918).
71. In Sherbert creation of the choice placed "the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."
374 U.S. at 404. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)
(dictum); Comment, supra note 62, at 152.
72. Where an individual does not want a public benefit, or where the Constitution
requires the condition, as was the case with the Amish in Yoder, the situation differs.
First, the benefit is not withheld as the result of the condition, because the individual
does not desire what the government offers, and so the choice between the benefit and
religious exercise does not penalize the individual's free exercise. Second, imposition of
the choice is not tantamount to requiring an objectionable course of action, because it
does not have any coercive effect on the individual. Finally, the establishment clause
compels the sort of "condition" implicated in Yoder. Even if an individual's religious
convictions required him to study doctrine in school and thus prevented him from
enjoying public education, the Constitution would prohibit public school instruction in
religious dogma and hence would directly impose a "constitutional condition."
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public benefit,73 whether or not attendance is compelled, 74 and an
academically significant course also is a public benefit, whether it is
prescribed or elective. 75 Undermining a student's religious beliefs,
violating his separatist religious activities, or compelling his declara-
tion of objectionable beliefs would burden free exercise of that in-
dividual's religion, and the state could not directly require these
changes in the student's belief and conduct. Incorporating instruction
contrary to his religious faith into the curriculum may impose a choice
between instructional material and religious exercise, and a choice in-
volving educationally important material such as biology70 may be
tantamount to a direct requirement of subjection to objectionable in-
struction and abandonment of religious precepts. Imposition of a
choice between subordination of religious imperatives and surrender
of valuable instruction, moreover, may coerce an individual to enroll
in a course despite violation of religious exercise.
73. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975), the Court treated education in a public
secondary school as a public benefit and sustained a due process challenge. Accord, Dixon
v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). In Dickey v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1967), the district court
treated education at a state university as a public benefit and upheld a First Amendment
complaint.
74. The Supreme Court ruled in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), that govern-
ment may not require surrender of the opportunity of holding public office for exercise
of religious convictions against professing belief in God. The state did not force Mr.
Torcaso to pursue public office, but by condition (the oath) it denied him a benefit
(opportunity for government employment). "The fact . . . that a person is not com-
pelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by
state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 495-96. Government similarly
did not force Mrs. Sherbert to seek unemployment compensation.
A state college imposed an unconstitutional condition when it forced a choice between
receipt of a public college education and enjoyment of constitutional rights to du
process, although no statute compelled attendance at the college. Dixon v. Alabama Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). Hence com-
pulsion to seek the public benefit, such as through compulsory school attendance laws, is
irrelevant to existence of an unconstitutional condition.
75. A federal court of appeals has ruled that a secondary school may not condition
enjoyment of specific public school courses on relinquishment of free exercise of
religion. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972). In Spence a student's religious
convictions opposed participation in Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and the public
school system effectively conditioned the liberal arts courses that were educationally im-
portant to him on enrollment in ROTC. Id. at 798. The student was not required to
take those particular courses in order to receive a diploma from the public school system.
Id. The court labeled this an unconstitutional choice and compared it to the unconstitu-
tional condition in Sherbert. Id. at 799, 800.
76. See, e.g., Sears, The Importance of Biology Teaching For Secondary School Pupils,
38 Ams. BIOLOGY TCHR. 14 (1976), reprinted from I Am. BIOLOGY TCHR. 67 (1939). Biology
occupies a significant place in the secondary school curricula, virtually always lasting a
full year. L. Os rNDOR & P. HORN, COURSE OFFERINGS, ENROLLMENTS, AND CURRICULUM
PRACTICES IN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1972-73, at 157 (NCES 77-153, 1976).
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c. Influence and Pressure from Teachers and Peers
Other forms of coercion against free exercise may arise from inter-
actions within the classroom. Teachers in public secondary and ele-
mentary schools can exert influence contrary to students' religious
tenets. This persuasive effect arises from the position of authority,
superiority in education, and difference in age of instructors.7 This
teacher influence has effect especially on vulnerable values such as
religious convictions78 and in technical subjects such as science.7 9
Further, the instructor's authority over grades and class discussion in-
cludes the ability to count discrepant responses "wrong" and thereby
to penalize disagreement with the classroom presentation. 0 The re-
sult is that students may alter personal beliefs when they conflict with
classroom instruction.8 '
Peers in public schools also can exert pressure against religious ex-
ercise by students. The peer group occupies a vital place in the life of
a student in secondary or elementary school.8 2 Conformity to behavior
and beliefs of fellow students is a strong drive of pupils at those levels
of maturity.8 3 The individual's need for group acceptance and social
77. Instructors influence pupils' performance and aspirations for similar reasons. See
A. ZANDER, T. CURTIS & H. ROSENFELD, THE INFLUENCE OF TEACHERS AND PEERS ON AsPIRA-
TIONS OF YOUTH 25, 78-79 (U.S. Office of Educ. 1961) (high school sophomores and
seniors); 34 DISSERTATION ABSTRACrS 1732A (1973) (abstracting J. Van Alst, The Effects of
Influenced Teacher and Student Expectations on Student Performance in Tenth Grade
Science (1973) (unpublished dissertation for Boston University)) (high school sophomores
in biology course); cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952) (instructor's use of
position and authority to persuade students in religious matters would be "coercion"
prohibited by free exercise clause).
78. E.g., Brown & Pallant, Religious Belief and Social Pressure, 10 PSYCH. Ra. 813,
814 (1962) ("Positive pressure produced a significant change in stated beliefs towards an
'expert's' opinion, showing that religious beliefs are susceptible to social influences.")
(high school-aged individuals). See notes 56 & 57 supra.
79. Patel & Gordon, Some Personal and Situational Determinants of Yielding to In-
fluence, 61 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PS YCH. 411, 414, 417 (1960) (prestige of source governs
suggestibility in high school students); Stone & James, Interval Scaling of the Prestige of
Selected Secondary Education Teacher-Specialties, 20 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILS 859,
860 (1965) (science teachers possess particularly high prestige).
80. See, e.g., Battle, Relation between Personal Values and Scholastic Achievement, J.
EXPERIMENTAL EDUC., Sept. 1957, at 27; 33 DISSERTATION ABSTAcrS 5825A, 5825A-26A
(1973) (abstracting D. Bartlett, Teacher Perception and Labeling of Discrepant Behavior
(1972) (unpublished dissertation for Peabody College)); Thompson, High School Students
and Their Values, 16 CAL. J. EDUc. RESEARCH 217, 219 (1965).
81. Sereno, Ego-Involvement, High Source Credibility, and Response to a Belief-Dis-
crepant Communication, 35 SPEECH MONOGRAPHs 476 (1968) (attitude change results from
belief-discrepant situation created by high-credibility source) (college students); see R.
BERENDA, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP ON THE JUDGMENTS OF CHILDREN 49 (1950) (students
aware of teacher's opinion in classroom, even if obviously wrong, will limit range of their
views and conform their beliefs more to that opinion) (elementary school students).
82. See note 99 infra.
83. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) ("Formal high school education
beyond the eighth grade ... places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish
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approval influences development of his values 4 and applies particu-
larly to maintenance of his religious convictions. s5 If a student com-
plies with peer pressure, he may forsake opinions, values, and practices
that differ significantly from the student group's8 0 and adopt principles
that conform to those of fellow students,87 even though that entails
subordination or abandonment of his religious exercise. s8 If he does
not conform to the peer group, fellow students may attempt to dis-
suade and influence him, 0 which normally causes change in opinion
or practice. 0 If a student withstands the pressure, the peer group may
beliefs ... with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group
.... "); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic
of children."); R. BERENDA, supra note 81, at 30 ("very strong need to remain a member
of one's group" and "fear of being accused by the others of wanting to be 'different' ").
84. E.g., E. HURLOCK, supra note 57, at 218 (elementary school-age individuals);
Argyle, Social Pressure in Public and Private Situations, 54 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH.
172, 174 (1957) ("norm formation is connected with the need for acceptance") (high
school students).
85. Pressure from peers carries particular influence upon religious convictions, because
"strong social support is required for the maintenance of a system of religious belief."
Brown, A Study of Religious Belief, 53 BIrT. J. PsYcH. 259, 268 (1962).
86. E.g., Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in GROUP DYNAMICS RESEARCH AND THEORY 189, 191, 193, 194 (2d ed. D. Cart-
wright & A. Zander 1960) (some minority individuals come "to perceive the majority
estimates as correct," others believe "that their perceptions are inaccurate," while others
"suppress their observations" though aware of majority's error); Festinger, A Theory of
Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUMAN REL. 117, 137 (1954) ("group has power to in-
fluence the member effectively and, in the case of opinion difference, . . . to eliminate
the difference of opinion").
87. E.g., R. BERENDA, supra note 81, at 32, 60 ("There is a statistically significant
change in the judgments of the minority children in the direction of the group," even if
it is plainly wrong, which reflects "a strong tendency to follow the majority."); Dashiell,
Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Individual
Human Adults, in A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1148 (C. Murchison ed. 1935) (in-
dividuals given information about majority student opinion shift to greater conformity)
(high school students).
88. E.g., C. HOVLAND, I. JAN1S & H. KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PESUASION: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE 159 (1953) (peer group norms disseminated in class-
room influence students' religious opinions) (high school students); Kelley, Salience of
Membership and Resistance to Change of Group-Anchored Attitudes, 8 HUMAN REL. 275,
288 (1955) (group can induce change in member's differing religious belief) (high school
students); Lasseigne, A Study of Peer and Adult Influence on Moral Beliefs of Adolescents,
10 ADOLESCENCE 227, 229 (1975) (adolescents become "extremely vulnerable" to peer group
influence in moral beliefs, and this influence "significantly" exceeds parent influence)
(high school students).
89. E.g., A. HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 44 (1962) (group pressures
deviant member and "will make overt attempts to secure the conformity of the deviant");
Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley &- Raven, The Influence Process in the Presence of
Extreme Deviates, 5 HUMAN REL. 327, 344, 345 (1952) (group seeks to obtain conformity)
[hereinafter cited as Influence Process].
90. E.g., Festinger, supra note 86, at 127 (group influence and pressure induces deviant
"to change [his] own opinion to agree more with the others in the group"); Influence
Process, supra note 89, at 344 (pressure toward uniformity in cohesive group increases
change in deviant opinions).
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reject him as a deviant and stigmatize him in various ways; 91 this can
cause severe emotional effects when religious issues are involved.92
If expression or practice of religious convictions must occur in front
of teachers and fellow students, restraint of free exercise is magnified.
Such a requirement deters manifestation of nonconforming beliefs and
conduct and causes declarations to be more conforming than private
beliefs actually are.93 It may induce a change in private convictions.94
Requiring a student to make statements offensive to his religious con-
victions in front of the class and teacher, or to write declarations of
belief on tests or essays for the instructor, would thus increase coercion
against his religious rights.
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the coercive effect of
the public school on religious exercise. The Court overturned a re-
leased-time program for religious instruction held within school class-
rooms in McCollum v. Board of Education,9" while it sustained a
similar program held away from school grounds in Zorach v. Clauson9
91. E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 289-90 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (objection to school program might cause students "to be stigmatized as ...
nonconformists"); Emerson, Deviation and Rejection: An Experimental Replication, 19
Am. Soc. REv. 688 (1954) (conforming group members reject deviants) (high school
students); Rosenberg, The Dissonant Religious Context and Emotional Disturbance, 68
Am. J. Soc. 1, 4 (1962) (majority labels nonconformist in group inferior, "excluding the
minority-group member from participation in activities, taunting him, hurling derogatory
epithets at him, or using the abundant variety of instruments of cruelty") (high school
students).
92. E.g., E. HUPjOCK, supra note 57, at 359 ("doubting religious doctrines is the source
of much mental anguish and emotional distress on the part of the adolescent"); Rosen-
berg, supra note 91, at 2, 4, 5, 9 (individuals living in dissonant religious environment
tend to develop "psychic or emotional disturbance," become "depressed," suffer a "sense
of being 'different,' an absence of 'belongingness,'" have "low self-esteem" and "in-
security which stems from lack of integration in a group," and become tense and un-
certain of their dignity).
93. E.g., A. HARE, supra note 89, at 35 (an individual "is more apt to conform if his
alternative is to go on record as a deviant in a group . . . whose influential members
disagree with him," so "views expressed in public or with a possibility of being made
public are more conforming" (emphasis omitted)); C. HOVLAND, I. JANIS & H. KELLEY,
supra note 88, at 168 (openly expressed opinions tend to be more conforming than
privately expressed opinions).
94. E.g., A. HARE, supra note 89, at 36 ("[W]here pressure is exerted on a person to
express an opinion different from the one he privately affirms, there is a tendency for
him to change his overt opinion .... "); Argyle, supra note 84, at 174 (susceptibility to
influence is larger when opinion must be stated in public rather than held privately).
95. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In a "released-time" program participating students are re-
leased from classes during a specified period within the school day for religious instruction.
96. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The program in McCollum was invalidated under the estab-
lishment clause, while that in Zorach was upheld over both establishment and free
exercise objections. The Supreme Court in Zorach carefully distinguished the prior case;
the released-time programs differed solely by the location of the instruction. "In the
McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the
public school was used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public
schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious
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As the Court's distinction between these cases indicates, the public
school classroom augments the persuasive force of instruction. This
may cause enrollment in an ostensibly elective course over religious
objections and may induce change in the religious convictions of a
student.
The state has ultimate responsibility for this teacher influence and
peer group pressure, 97 as it does for prescribed courses and unconstitu-
tional conditions. It places a dissenting student in the situation where
this coercion can be exerted against his religious exercises through
compulsion of attendance.98 This occurs at a maturity level at which
individuals are highly susceptible to influence against religious impera-
tives. The government, moreover, establishes the curricula and builds
certain subjects around material objectionable to some religions. It
hires the teachers and delegates authority to them to present the sub-
ject, to discipline deviant students, to define "wrong" answers, and to
instruction." 343 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added). Zorach stressed the lack of coercion from
a released-time program away from school grounds. Id. at 311. In a subsequent decision
the Court emphasized the presence of coercion in the McCollum program in school class-
rooms: "this system had the effect of coercing the children to attend religious classes."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961). See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 262 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Although the Court in McCollum
chose to rest the decision on establishment grounds, it used "the prop of 'free exercise' to
give it support." Weclew, The Establishment Clause and "Coercion," 47 MARQ. L. REV.
359, 360 (1963-64). And although in Zorach it rejected the challenge under the free
exercise clause, the Court noted that "[i]f in fact coercion were used . .. a wholly different
case would be presented." 343 U.S. at 311. Even without full development of the distinc-
tion, these cases implicitly recognize that the public school classroom carries substantial
influence over student religious values.
97. The federal district court in Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F.
Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974), questioned whether exclusive instruction in the general theory of
evolution involves state action.
Defendants, however, are not acting pursuant either to State law or school district
regulation. Plaintiffs have not alleged that there exists even a school district policy
regarding the theory of evolution. All that can be said is that certain textbooks
selected by school officials present what Plaintiffs deem a biased view in support of
the theory.
366 F. Supp. at 1210. The court termed this "so nebulous an intrusion upon the principle
of religious neutrality" as not to present a substantial constitutional question. Id. Had
there been a trial on the merits, however, the plaintiffs might have shown that Texas had
a compulsory attendance law and selected biology textbooks that school districts must use,
all of which exclusively presented the general theory, and that the school districts hired
teachers who designed classroom instruction. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 21.032,
12.11(e), 12.13, 12.15(b), 12.16(c), 13.101 (Vernon 1972). These state actions initiate the
instruction and classroom requirements that restrain free exercise, thus creating the
situation in which a coercive burden arises.
98. Schempp v. Abington School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1959), vacated
and remanded, 364 U.S. 298 (1960) ("This mandatory requirement of school attendance
puts the children in the path of the compulsion."); K. ALEXANDER & K. JORDAN, LEGAL
AsPEcrs OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: COMPuLsORY ATrENDANCE AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT 12,
60 (1973) (every state but one has compulsory attendance requirement).
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dispense grades. The state also creates the school peer group by com-
pelling the attendance of other individuals, and elevates it to prime
importance in a minority student's life by extending school hours
over so large a part of the day. 99
3. Assessment of the Burden from Exclusive Presentation of the
General Theory
The impact on religious liberty described above is not merely
theoretical; it poses a real and substantial threat to free exercise. 100
Nearly all secondary school students enroll in at least a first-year
biology course.' 0 ' Most biology courses in public schools exclusively
present the general theory of evolution, because textbooks ordinarily
teach only that theory' 02 and the treatment in the text generally
governs the classroom presentation103 Moreover, the general theory
99. Compulsory education produces a peer group that occupies a place of tremendous
importance in the life of a student, and gives a disproportionate impact to pressures
from fellow pupils.
This setting-apart of our children in schools-which take on ever more functions,
ever more "extracurricular activities"-for an ever longer period of training has a
singular impact on the child of high-school age. He is "cut off" from the rest of
society, forced inward toward his own age group, made to carry out his whole social
life with others his own age. With his fellows, he comes to constitute a small society,
one that has most of its important interactions within itself, and maintains only a
few threads of connection with the outside adult society.
J. COLEMAN, THE ADOLESCENT SOCIETY 3 (1961) (high school students) (emphasis in
original).
100. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of con-
stitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.")
101. In American public secondary schools 92.8% of tenth-grade students enroll, have
enrolled, or will enroll in a first-year biology course. L. OSTERNDORF & P. HORN, supra
note 76, at 15, 54. The few secondary schools that do not offer any biology courses ac-
count for part of the remaining 7.2%. Moreover, the trend is toward universal study of
this subject. Id. at 15; L. OSTERNDORF, SUMMARY OF OFFERINGS AND ENROLLMENTS IN PUBLIC
SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1972-73, at 3, 18 (NCES 76-150, 1975).
Several factors appear to underlie this nearly universal enrollment. Prescription of the
course by the legislature, school district, or individual school causes many students to
take a biology course. For example, West Virginia requires a year of biology study for all
public school students. State Sup't of Schools, Secondary Schools: Standards for Classifica-
tion 20 (1976-77). The importance of the benefit of biology instruction to career plans,
college preparation, or general education induces many other students to enroll. See note
76 supra. Pressure from instructors and peers to conform with prevailing beliefs and the
normal course pattern and to subordinate religious qualms influences some students to
enter a biology course. Whatever the specific reasons, most American high school students
do study biology.
102. The major high school biology textbooks, listed at note 25 supra, give great em-
phasis to the general theory of evolution. Compare notes 26-30 supra with note 104
infra. They do not present any model of creation.
103. Kastrinos, Survey of the Teaching of Biology in Secondary Schools, 98 SCH. &
Soc'Y 241, 242 (1970); Kastrinos & Voss, Influence of the Textbook on Topics Remembered
by Students Who Took College Boards in Biology, 32 Am. BIOLOGY TCHR. 227, 233 (1970).
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permeates substantial portions of the biology texts in greatest use. 04
Such exclusive and pervasive presentation of the general theory makes
it irrelevant, for purposes of assessing interference with free exercise,
whether that scientific model is labeled "the fact" or "the theory" or
"one theory."'' 10
Exclusive public school instruction in the general theory burdens
free exercise.' 00 It can undermine religious belief in creation and can
inculcate a contrary belief. 0 7 It can violate separatist practices of
104. The teachers' guidebook designed primarily for BSCS biology textbooks states that
"[b]ecause of its pervasive and comprehensive character, evolution is treated in three
different ways in the BSCS materials. . . . [E]volution either as history or as process is
interwoven in all other chapters where it has a place .... ." E. KLINCKMANN, BIOLOGY
TEACHERS' HADBOOK 16 (2d ed. 1970) (emphasis added). The chairman of the board of
directors of BSCS emphasizes that of the nine unifying themes of these texts, the general
theory of "evolution is not only one of the major themes but is, in fact, central among
the other themes; they are interrelated, and each is particularly related to evolution." Lee,
The BSCS Position on the Teaching of Biology, BSCS NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1972, at 5. In
BSCS Blue the general theory is "the most inclusive of the great unifying principles of
biology." BSCS BLUE, supra note 25, at 105. In BSCS Green "[tihe entire course ... can
be regarded as a summary of the evidence for evolution," and in BSCS Yellow "[e]volution
is another pervasive theme that is developed throughout the book." E. KLINCKMANN,
supra at 68, 74. This interlacing of the general theory can be seen in notes 26-30 supra.
105. The textbook authors, in describing the general theory of evolution as "theory,"
signify something tantamount to fact. The widely used Biology Teachers' Handbook
qualifies the meaning of that term:
A special word is necessary concerning our habit of referring to the "theory of
evolution." This usage is often taken to mean that evolution is but an envisaged
possibility, something uncertain and unproved.
This sense of "theory" no longer holds in science, if it ever did .... Evolution is
a theory in this sense, yes-a body of interrelated facts. As new facts about evolution
are discovered, the organization may be changed in order to include them, but this
would not mean that the present organization of facts now known is unsound.
E. KLINCKMANN, supra note 104, at 16 (emphasis added; original emphasis omitted).
The effect of exclusive presentation of the general theory is to teach it as fact. A
British professor, who is not a creationist, made this point in outlining a conversation
with a biology student. In response to the tutor's request for "'the evidence against the
[general] theory of Evolution,'" the student would respond "'[b]ut there isn't any, sir.'"
The student actually "would be behaving like certain of those religious students he affects
to despise," by "taking on faith what he could not intellectually understand and . . .
appeal[ing] to authority . . . of a 'good book' . . . The Origin of Species." The professor
would instruct him to "read the evidence for and against Evolution and present it as an
essay." The student, "armed with an essay on the evidence for Evolution," would return
to report that he "'could not find anything in the scientific books against Evolution'" and
that "'there does not seem to be [a scientific argument against Evolution].'" The tutor
"would . . .mention that he might have looked at the book by Radl, The History of
Biological Theories." G. KERKUT, supra note 2, at 4-5.
106. This section does not argue that restraint of free exercise results from any dis-
cussion of the general theory of evolution, but only from exclusive presentation of that
view of origins.
107. Creationist convictions are especially vulnerable to influence at this educational
stage. Several studies prove that belief in God as Creator and literal acceptance of the
Genesis account of creation decline sharply as students reach 12-18 years of age, or the
seventh through twelfth grades. K. HYDE, supra note 57, at 44 (citing authorities).
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creationist religions.'1 8 Exclusive instruction also can compel un-
conscionable declarations of belief, because creationist individuals
object to affirmation of the general theory for test questions or class
discussion.10 9 These restraints become substantial through operation
of the various forms of coercion present in public schools.
It is true that subjection of all students to the general theory, re-
gardless of their religious convictions, appears neutral. Governmental
action, however, still may burden free exercise of religion, though it
applies uniformly to all individuals and seems secular in nature. The
Supreme Court has abandoned the "secular regulation" rule"10 that
sustained general regulations dealing with nonreligious matters re-
gardless of their contrariety to religious tenets or burden on religious
exercise."' In Yoder it ruled that "[a] regulation neutral on its face
may... nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for govern-
mental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."
112
Public school instruction, then, is not immune from constitutional
scrutiny merely because it appears nonreligious and applies generally.
108. For example, the Baptist Bible Fellowship both practices separation from pre-
dominantly hostile teachings, see note 44 supra, and affirms special creation of the
world, living kinds, and man, see note 21 supra. This involves separation from exclusive
presentation of the general theory, because the Fellowship believes that the "effect of a
public school teaching only evolution is to indoctrinate students in that view and to
destroy their belief in divine creation. Causing children to sit through only one ex-
planation . .. might violate practice of separatism." The Fellowship, however, only
"opposes indoctrination in evolution as the only theory" and "does not oppose all study
of evolution." Letter from Dr. R. Herbert Fitzpatrick, Trustee of Baptist Bible College
(Sept. 27, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Most creationist religions also arc
separatist. See, e.g., WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY, TRUE PEACE AND SECURITY 128,
131 (1973) (Jehovah's Witnesses); Roth, Sanctity and Separation, TRADITION, Fall 1974, at
29 (Orthodox Jews); Commission on Theology and Church Relations, Lutheran Church,
Missouri Synod, Report: Theology of Fellowship 23 (undated).
109. This cannot be justified as requiring those students to state facts, because their
very objection is that the general theory is not verifiable fact. See note 19 supra (con-
trariety defined by individual's religion). Nor can it be defended as not compelling them
to change their private religious beliefs, because the First Amendment nonetheless pro-
scribes requirement of declarations contrary to religious belief. See West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) ("It is not clear whether the regulation con-
templates that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling
converts to the prescribed ceremony or . .. if they simulate assent by words without
belief ....")
110. D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR 51 (1962) (emphasis omitted).
111. Galanter, supra note 18, at 231-55. The rule effectively was rejected in West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). There, the compulsory flag pledge
and salute, which appeared not to be a religious exercise and applied uniformly to all
students, was found unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision in
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which had sustained a similar
requirement as a secular regulation, id. at 594-95.
112. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). Id. (not sufficient justification that requirement "applies
uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, discriminate against
religions or a particular religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns");
see State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 204, 351 N.E.2d 750, 764 (1976).
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C. Accommodation with the State Interest
To determine whether a coercive burden on religious faith and
practice constitutes an abridgment of free exercise, accommodation of
the individual's religious liberty and the state's affected interest must
be accomplished. Although courts have employed many approaches
to accommodate these conflicting interests," 83 it is not sufficient for
the government merely to show a "reasonable relation" between the
challenged program and a valid state concern. 1 4 Nor is it adequate for
a court simply to balance the free exercise right against the govern-
mental interest.l xa Free exercise cases generally require a compelling
state interest to override an individual's First Amendment claim.2 6
113. The Court employed a clear and present danger test in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); a balancing test in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939); a
directness test in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-07 (1961) (plurality opinion); and
a compelling state interest test in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). These tests
are summarized and evaluated in Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated,
125 U. PA. L. Rtv. 812, 837-56 (1977); see DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the
Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 161, 164-86 (1972).
114. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). Religious exercise is a preferred freedom.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144-49
(1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
115. An ad hoc balancing test reduces a constitutional guarantee to a mere weight on
the scales and requires judicial assessment of legislative matters and individual im-
ponderables. The Court has observed in dictum that it is "inappropriate for this Court to
label one [interest] as being more important or substantial than the other." United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967). Professor Emerson has concluded that the test is
unstructured and subjective: "[i]n the hands of most judges the balancing test comes to
be nothing more than a way of rationalizing preformed conclusions." T. EMERSON, supra
note 34, at 718. Ad hoc balancing has been soundly criticized. E.g., DuVal, supra note 113,
at 172-78; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1441-45, 1449
(1962); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 939-41 (1968).
Weighing of personal interests, such as the centrality of an infringed exercise to the
individual or his religion or the extent of infringement, reaches beyond the judiciary's
constitutional domain and practical capabilities. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337
F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416 U.S.
932 (1974) ("The protection the Constitution extends to the exercise of religion does not
turn on the theological importance of the disputed activity. Rather constitutional protec-
tion is triggered by the fact that it is religious."); see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976) (free exercise clause does not permit judicial as-
sessment of questions of doctrine and church law); Presbyterian Church v. Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 450 (1969) (same). A recent case, in
which a federal district court balanced away free exercise rights, exemplifies the perils of
the ad hoc approach. The court refused to excuse public school students from classrooms
using audio-visual projections or teaching music and health, despite their sincere religious
convictions against viewing audio-visuals, singing worldly music, or publicly discussing
family relationships and sexual matters. The judge's mythical scales determined that the
state's interest in education overbalanced the students' interest in free exercise. Davis v.
Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 399, 406 (D.N.H. 1974).
116. Comment, supra note 113, at 851. The compelling interest test requires determin-
ing which state interests are compelling and which are noncompelling, through
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This means that the state, in order to justify a restraint on religious
liberty, must have a compelling interest in the challenged program
and must utilize the least burdensome means for achieving that in-
terest.
1. Compelling State Interest
The Supreme Court explicitly adopted this test for free exercise
cases in Sherbert v. Verner.'117 A state program could be sustained only
if "any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion
may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power . ' ,"s Matters in
which government has a compelling interest "have invariably posed
some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 119 The Court
followed this approach in Yoder, 20 though not without ambiguity,
when it ruled that a governmental program must further "those in-
terests of the highest order" to prevail. 21
formulating "rules for differentiating between protected and unprotected [religious
exercises]." It then requires applying the category to the case, so that if a governmental
interest is compelling the state prevails and if the interest is noncompelling the state loses.
DuVal, supra note 113, at 179. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975)
("categorization"); Nimmer, supra note 115 ("definitional balancing"). This test differs
from ad hoc balancing, because the first step yields a category that provides precedent
for later cases, while the second step avoids balancing entirely. DuVal, supra note 113, at
179. The definitional balancing involved in the first step differs from the ad hoc process,
moreover, because it weighs only the state interest and not also the individual religious
interest. See note 115 supra.
117. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In the freedom of speech area, the Court apparently em-
ployed the compelling state interest test in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). See Marcus, supra note 34, at 1241; Nimmer, supra note 115, at
942-44.
118. 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). The Court
"consider[ed] whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial in-
fringement of appellant's First Amendment right." Id. at 406.
In applying the compelling interest test, the number of individuals suffering restraint
of religious freedom is irrelevant; the free exercise clause extends protection to the
smallest minority as well as the largest religion. Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise
Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 333 (1969). In alleviating an abridgment of free exercise,
however, this Note will argue that the actual and potential number of individuals affect-
ed is a factor relevant to the choice of remedy. See pp. 549-50 infra.
119. 374 U.S. at 403. Accord, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 23.
120. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
121. 406 U.S. at 215. The rule resulting from Sherbert and Yoder is that If "the in-
dividual demonstrates that his actions ... have been interfered with as a result of a
state regulation, the state must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest . ..which
could not be promoted by any less restrictive means. If the state makes that demonstra-
tion, it prevails . .. ; if not, it loses." Marcus, supra note 34, at 1242. The opinion in Yoder
produced confusion by stating that a state program that interferes with religious liberty
must have "a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
540
Science Instruction in Public Schools
Government clearly has an important interest in education .12 2 An
overly expansive definition of a governmental interest, however, could
suppress individual rights, so a court should assess only the state in-
terest in the challenged portion of a program.12  The Supreme Court
in Yoder considered the state's interest in compulsory attendance be-
tween eighth grade and age sixteen rather than its interest in educa-
tion generally. 124 Similarly, in a challenge to public school curricula,
a court should focus attention solely on the governmental interest in
the questioned portion of the academic program. 12
In a challenge to exclusive instruction in the general theory of
evolution, the state has several interests at stake: educating its citizens,
designing public school curricula, teaching biology, and presenting the
general theory. The free exercise claim of creationists does not threaten
the entire state interest in education or curricula, but only that in
presenting and designing specific courses. Moreover, the challenge does
not implicate the entire biology course, but only that part dealing with
the origin of life. And it does not question all instruction in the
general theory, but only exclusive instruction in that theory. In com-
parison with other governmental interests in education found to be
compelling-such as vaccination of pupils, 26 assurance of teacher
protection under the Free Exercise Clause." 406 U.S. at 214. However, the Court's require-
ment that the state demonstrate an interest of "the highest order" and the citation to
Sherbert, 406 U.S. at 215, make clear that the decision reaffirmed the compelling interest
test. See State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 217 n.17, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 n.17 (1976)
(citing Yoder and Sherbert as using compelling interest test). Accord, Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (employing compelling interest test).
122. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). The courts have
not established conclusively, however, that this important interest in education is a com-
pelling interest. Yoder noted that because "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance . . . free exercise," the state interest in
universal compulsory education "is by no means absolute to the exclusion or sub-
ordination of all other interests." 406 U.S. at 215. Hence the Court found the burden on
free exercise unjustified by any compelling interest.
123. Frantz, supra note 115, at 1441. The judiciary, moreover, should consider only
substantial evidence of interference with a school program from a free exercise challenge
and not mere speculative threats. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963).
124. The Supreme Court assessed the governmental "interest in providing an addi-
tional one or two years of compulsory high school education," and found that "an ad-
ditional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children ...would do little
to serve those [state] interests." 406 U.S. at 222, 224. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963) (state interest in welfare eligibility provision, not interest in unemployment com-
pensation or in public welfare); State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 447, 182 N.W.2d 539,
542, 547 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state interest in
two years of schooling, not interest in education generally).
125. See Note, The Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68 MICH. L. RPv. 1050, 1056 (1970).
126. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). In Jacobson the Court ruled
vaccination of children to fall within a substantial state interest, 197 U.S. at 31-33, and
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loyalty,127 and nonencouragement of school segregation 28 -these con-
cerns do not appear to be compelling interests.129
2. Least Burdensome Means
Even if a compelling interest underlies a governmental program,
under Sherbert the program could be sustained only if "no alternative
forms of regulation" would satisfy that state interest without burden-
ing free exercise.130 Yoder similarly required that restraints be justi-
fied by state "interests ... not otherwise served."'131 This requirement
does not demand merely that no less burdensome means further "the
state's interest as much as it is furthered by the challenged means," but
that no such alternatives "serv[e] the state's interest sufficiently."' 32
The latter, the sufficiency approach to alternative means, provides
greater protection for free exercise than the former, the efficiency ap-
proach. Where religious liberty is at stake, the state has the burden of
disproving the sufficiency of less burdensome means. 33
The state's interests in teaching biology and in presenting the gen-
eral theory can be served by means less burdensome than exclusive
presentation of that theory in public schools. For example, more than
one nonreligious model of the origin of the world and life could be
taught instead of just the general theory, or biology could be offered
without any discussion of origins. In light of student impressionability,
subsequent decisions have read this to involve a compelling state interest. E.g., Weiden-
feller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 450 & n.8 (E.D. Wis. 1974); see Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
127. Biklen v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902, 909 (N.D.N.Y. 1971), af 'd mew., 406
U.S. 951 (1972).
128. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167, ajj'd wem. sub now. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
129. The state interest in a topic within a secondary school biology course appears
similar to its interest in a high school ROTC course, and that is not a compelling in-
terest. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 799 (6th Cir. 1972). And it resembles the govern-
mental interest in intrusive educational standards, which also is noncompelling. State v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 217-18, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (1976). Cf. Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("[W]here the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no
matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First
Amendment right" and hence cannot be compelling.); Hirschoff, Parents and the Public
School Curriculum: Is There a Right To Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable
Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 871, 957 (1977) (only state interests in teaching basic
reading, writing, arithmetic, and constitutional government are sufficiently substantial
to overcome parental objections to curricula).
130. 374 U.S. at 407.
131. 406 U.S. at 215. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147, 148-49 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181,
217, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (1976).
132. Comment, supra note 113, at 868. See Ely, supra note 116, at 1484-85.
133. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
144-49 (1943); P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 19-21.
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classroom influence, and the conditioned educational benefit, any such
alternative to exclusive instruction in the general theory appears to be
considerably less burdensome.
Because no compelling state interest is present and less burdensome
means are available, exclusive instruction in the general theory of
evolution in public school classrooms abridges free exercise of religion.
The following discussion describes several alternative methods for
alleviation of this infringement and assesses their constitutional im-
plications and their differing effects on state and individual interests. 34
II. Remedies Available for Free Exercise Abridgment from Public
School Instruction in the Origin of the World and Life
When a court determines that state action abridges free exercise of
religion, it must fashion or order a suitable remedy to remove that
unconstitutional burden. The least burdensome means test requires
that the court consider the availability of alternatives to the state action
and requires implementation of any sufficient alternatives. The greater
strictures of the compelling state interest test, compared with prior free
exercise standards, necessitate that the judiciary consider affirmative
relief from infringements of religious liberty.135 This more extensive
relief, however, can produce tension between the free exercise and
establishment clauses,136 because it may appear to favor the burdened
religious group over others and may harmonize with religious exercises
despite nonreligious means. A careful construction of the scope of the
establishment clause can mitigate much of this tension; 137 nevertheless,
134. When a challenged program lacks a compelling state interest, the government
must remove the burden on free exercise, and not merely return the individual and
state interests into balance, as the ad hoc balancing test would seem to permit. See
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (freedom of speech); Comment, supra note
62, at 163.
135. See P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 42-43. For example, courts applying a compelling
interest test to free exercise claims often have required affirmative relief for prison in-
mates. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wilson v. Beame, 380
F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
136. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) ("[LT]ension in-
evitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses .... "). For
judicial attempts to reconcile the religion clauses, see, e.g., Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (neutrality); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(accommodation); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (strict separation).
See P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 59. For attempts by commentators, see, e.g., W. KATz,
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONsrITUTIONS 91 (1964) ("impact of the First Amendment on
religion is best understood in terms . . . of government neutrality"); P. KURLAND, supra
note 18, at 18 (no "classification in terms of religion"); Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert:
Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, [1963] RELIG ION & PUB. ORD. 3, 27 (1964)
("benevolent neutrality").
137. See pp. 551-53 infra.
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alleviation of free exercise abridgments must not violate this con-
stitutional provision.
Approaches to relief from an unconstitutional burden can be divided
into three categories. Ordinarily, exemption from a state program or
requirement can safeguard the free exercise of individuals suffering
abridgment. Also, neutralization of governmental action, by imple-
mentation of a less burdensome means to achieve the state purpose,
can accommodate the religious exercise of affected individuals.' 3
Finally, elimination of the state program or requirement can alleviate
the restraint on religious liberty. 3 9 The judiciary might order exemp-
tion in a situation in which that remedy would prove adequate. Be-
cause "[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for .. .
solving [varied local school] problems,' 40 a court might remand the
case to educational authorities to consider alternative means in cir-
cumstances in which exemption would be inadequate. These school
authorities would consider means less burdensome than the offending
program for satisfying legitimate state concerns, while the court would
retain jurisdiction to insure protection of free exercise.14n
138. For example, in Pitts v. Knowles, 339 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1972), aff'd
mem., 478 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.. 1973), a Muslim inmate challenged the restricted avail-
ability of the Koran in comparison with an abundant supply of Bibles. Id. at 1185. The
court required the prison to provide equal access to the Koran, thereby neutralizing the
governmental program of provision of sacred texts, rather than ending the program or
implementing a meaningless exemption. Id. at 1186; cf. Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284,
1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 (1974) (legislative neutralization to avert abridg-
ment of exercise of some religions).
139. For example, in State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), a
private sectarian school alleged that state "minimum standards" for schools impeded
Bible instruction demanded by a religious faith. The Ohio Supreme Court eliminated
the requirement as an abridgment of free exercise, rather than exempting the school
from the law or neutralizing the requirement, and pointed to the possibility of less
burdensome means which the legislature could adopt. Id. at 216-18, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
The state subsequently enacted a neutralized law. See Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3301.07
(Page Supp. 1976).
140. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
141. The judiciary should take an approach in vindicating free exercise rights some-
what like its approach in protecting Fourteenth Amendment rights. In Brown the
Supreme Court recognized that "[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving [varied local school] problems," and so "remandted] the
cases to those [trial] courts" for "consider[ing] whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles." Id. at
299. While educational officials prepared proposals, the judiciary retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 301. In fashioning and implementing their final decrees, the trial courts applied
equitable principles. Id. at 300; see Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749, 2757 (1977).
Equitable relief to restore infringed Fourteenth Amendment rights has included remedial
educational programs. Id. at 2759. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 523 F.2d 885, 887
(8th Cir. 1975); George v. O'Kelly, 448 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1971); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), af 'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). The
courts would implement elimination in situations in which all alternative means fail to
protect free exercise or violate the establishment clause or other constitutional provisions.
See p. 566 & notes 251-57 infra.
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A. Exemption
Exemption is the preferred remedy if it effectively removes the
burden from free exercise, because it least interferes with the state
interest in an existing program. It is especially appropriate where a
very substantial state interest underlies the present form of a program
in public schools, 4 2 where grave disruption of a governmental under-
taking would accompany adoption of any alternatives to challenged
aspects of the undertaking, 14 3 or where the least burdensome means
already have been employed by school curricula or activities.144 Exemp-
tion also is appropriate where the complainants disfavor other possible
approaches to alleviating the abridgment,' 45 where the maturity of
the students affected reduces the extent of restraint on free exercise, 46
or where only an insubstantial part of the school curricula or activities
elicits the challenge. 147
None of these special factors is present where exclusive instruction
142. Government has a compelling interest in vaccination, see note 126 supra, so
permissive accommodation of religious objection to vaccination requirements takes the
form of exemption. See, e.g., Kleid v. Board of Educ., 406 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Ky. 1976);
State v. Miday, 263 N.C. 747, 140 S.E.2d 325 (1965). The state has a similar interest in
laws against fraud, so the Supreme Court exempted the "I Am" religion from considera-
tion of the verity of its doctrines while sustaining an antifraud statute. See United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
143. Grave interference with an unemployment compensation system would result
from elimination of the eligibility requirement that an applicant accept available work,
so the Supreme Court exempted a Seventh-day Adventist from the requirement. See
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
144. Where public school instruction already has been neutralized, as by presentation
of alternate viewpoints on a subject that has implications for religion such as sex educa-
tion, excusal is the proper remedy though complainants seek exclusion of all viewpoints
except their own. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51
Cal. App. 3d 1, 21, 24, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 84, 86 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908
(1976); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 414, 289 A.2d 914, 923
(C.P. 1971).
145. Where individuals oppose all forms of a state program or requirement rather
than merely an unneutral form, as in the Amish objection to compulsory education after
eighth grade, exemption is proper even if more extensive relief may be merited. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
146. College students are less vulnerable than secondary or elementary school students
to influence by professors and fellow students or pressure toward conformity. See Roemer
v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 685-86 (1971). Furthermore, in higher levels of education the student body is less
cohesive and larger, so other students are less aware of exemption of an individual from
a school program; and more course options are available while fewer courses are
prescribed, so not enrolling in a college course is different from requesting exemption
from a high school course. See P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 98.
147. Because the words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance are an insignificant
part of opening exercises in public school classrooms, easily omitted without others
noticing, exemption from reciting those words was adequate relief. Lewis v. Allen, 5
Misc. 2d 68, 74, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1957), afl'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 447, 207
N.Y.S.2d 862 (1960), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 867, 252 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
923 (1964). Religious references in the national anthem also are "incidental" and thus
only require exemption. See Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Ariz. 1963).
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in the general theory abridges free exercise. The state does not have a
compelling interest in exclusive presentation of that theory; 143 alterna-
tive means would not necessarily frustrate the governmental interest
in teaching biology or including the general theory; and sufficient al-
ternatives are less burdensome for religious exercise.149 Furthermore,
there is no reason to believe that most creationist students would
prefer exemption; secondary and elementary school students are sus-
ceptible to coercive pressures; and a biology course is a significant part
of the academic curriculum.
Exemption is not an adequate remedy, besides not being the
preferred remedy, when it fails to remove the burden on free exercise.
This occurs if coercion persists against religious freedom, and may
occur if the abridgment potentially affects a large number of in-
dividuals.
1. Persistent Coercion
The adequacy of exemption as a remedy is questionable when,
despite the availability of exemption from a course or individual class,
coercive pressures persist. The federal district court in Schempp v.
Abington School District,30 for example, ruled that compulsion from
influence of teachers and fellow students and from the tendency toward
conformity destroyed the effectiveness of exemption from classroom
Bible reading.'3 ' In fact, Donna Schempp did not request exemption
because it would impair her standing with teachers and peers.'3 2 Al-
though the Supreme Court based its subsequent decision on the
establishment ground, Justice Brennan argued in concurrence that the
program abridged free exercise despite "the availability of excusal,"
because students are reluctant "to step out of line or to flout 'peer-
group norms,'" to profess unpopular beliefs publicly, or "to be
stigmatized as . . . nonconformists simply on the basis of their re-
quest." 1 3 Consequently, "the excusal procedure itself necessarily
operates in such a way as to infringe the rights of free exercise of those
148. See note 129 supra.
149. See pp. 550-70 infra.
150. 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959), vacated and remanded, 364 U.S. 298 (1960), on
remand, 195 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
151. 177 F. Supp. at 406. The program abridged free exercise, id. at 408, even though
excusal was available. 374 U.S. at 207, 211 n.4.
152. 374 U.S. at 208. Donna even volunteered to do some of the Bible reading herself.
177 F. Supp. at 400.
153. 374 U.S. at 288, 290. Justice Harlan, subsequently commenting on Schempp, also
acknowledged "the attendant pressures on the school children that such an exercise
entails." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 423 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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children who wish to be excused" and "may well deter those children
who do not wish to participate ... from exercising an indisputably
constitutional right to be excused."' 1 4 Justice Brennan's concurrence
echoed a theme articulated earlier by Justice Frankfurter, that the
availability of exemption from a program "does not eliminate the
operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience
.... The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an out-
standing characteristic of children."' 5 Moreover, several state courts
have determined that persisting coercion renders exemption from the
classroom illusory.156
Exemption of creationist students from those individual classes
within a course that exclusively teach the general theory of evolution
would be inadequate, because it would fail to counter the coercive
effects of influence from teachers and pressure from peers.1a5 Exemp-
tion from individual classes also would fail to alter the coercive effect
of the unconstitutional condition on biology instruction. Where the
general theory pervades much of a biology course, as is usually the
case, 58 students confront a coercive choice between missing much other
material with which the general theory is interwoven and sub-
ordinating their religious objections against participation in those
classes. 0 9 Although the district court in Wright v. Houston Inde-
154. 374 U.S. at 288, 289. See Weclew, supra note 96, at 363-64.
155. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Although the decision in McCollum rested on the establishment clause, the Court also
acknowledged pressure from teachers and fellow students, id. at 209, 212, and "found
that this system had the effect of coercing the children to attend religious classes." Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961). See note 96 supra.
156. See, e.g., People v. Board of Educ., 245 111. 334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910)
(excusal inadequate because places student "at a disadvantage" and "subjects him to a
religious stigma"); Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 1050, 68 So.
116, 121 (1915) (exemption worthless because isolates and stigmatizes student); State v.
District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44 N.W. 967, 975 (1890) (exemption
insufficient because pupil is "subjected to reproach").
157. Moreover, the necessity of a number of exemptions from class on nonconsecutive
dals would magnify pressure against excusal. Because the general theory appears in many
parts of the ordinary biology course, rather than in a block, see note 104 supra, the act
of exemption would have to occur not just once but many times during the academic
year. Also, the controversial nature of the origin of the universe and living forms would
appear to make this coercion potentially even greater. And a school structure without
segmented classes for each subject would add to coercive forces. Because most elementary
schools that teach biology, as well as a few high schools, do not change classrooms, switch
teachers, and shift class membership for each different subject, the act of excusal would
be more visible while the peer group would be more cohesive than in other schools.
158. Compare note 104 supra with notes 26-30 supra.
159. Relief in unconstitutional condition cases is not restricted to exemption. The
impact of an unconstitutional choice can be just as severe as the effect of a direct pro-
hibition against religious exercises. Hence the Supreme Court ordered elimination rather
than exemption in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), and excusal has proved in-
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pendent School District16 ° found exemption sufficient, it failed to
consider these pressures that arise from teacher and student influence
and from the unconstitutional condition.' 0 '
Exemption from an entire course that exclusively teaches the general
theory would also be inadequate. Although school officials might re-
move biology as a graduation requirement, the unconstitutional condi-
tion on that public benefit would continue to penalize free exercise,
because making the course elective would not reduce the importance
of the material contained in the course. Where creationist individuals
value instruction in other aspects of biology, for college preparation
or career plans or general education, the coercive choice persists. In-
fluence from teachers and peers also would persist in pressuring crea-
tionist students to ignore the availability of excusal and to subordinate
their nonconforming religious scruples. Although this pressure may
not be as acute as the coercion against exemption from individual
classes, influence would still exist to follow the normal course pattern
or to accept the prevailing viewpoint.
Thus neither exemption from the class nor exemption from the
course would adequately alleviate abridgment from exclusive instruc-
tion in the general theory. In contrast to Yoder, where excusal termi-
nated pressure from school authorities and peer groups because the
Amish students left the school rather than just a course,1 2 coercion
from instructors and fellow students would continue unabated. In
contrast to Sherbert, where exemption made receipt of unemployment
compensation as well as exercise of sabbatarian convictions possible, 163
coercion from the unconstitutional choice would persist unmitigated.
sufficient in other unconstitutional condition cases implicating the First Amendment.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
293 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
160. 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), af'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
161. Id. at 1212. Wright addressed only the objection that exemption entails a religious
profession of faith, and not the more weighty objections that this option is effectively
unavailable because of deprivation of a public benefit and pressure from teachers and
students. See note 61 supra.
162. The Amish students returned to a separate community, and consequently no
longer came into contact with former teachers or peers in other classes, at lunch, after
school, or on weekends. See 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972); J. HOSrETLER, supra note 46, at 21.
163. Exemption in Sherbert made receipt of the public benefit possible, whereas
exemption from a biology course makes enjoyment of that public benefit impossible.
Moreover, Mrs. Sherbert as an adult was not susceptible to the pressures to which
secondary and elementary school students are susceptible, and her acquaintances might
never have learned of her exemption or its religious basis.
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2. Widespread Potential Abridgment
The value of exemption as a remedy is doubtful when widespread
abridgment might occur. As the potential impact grows, excusal be-
comes less preferable to the state because its interference with school
curricula approaches in degree that of alternative remedies. The
Supreme Court has not given explicit recognition to this factor in free
exercise cases, but potential impact provides a unifying principle
behind the remedies chosen in many of the Court's decisions. In gen-
eral, where the Court has ordered exemption governmental action has
actually and potentially threatened the free exercise of a relatively
small number of individuals, and where it has required more extensive
relief the state has threatened the freedom of a comparatively great
number.164
The complainants were exempted in Yoder where only ninety-three
Amish children attended public schools in the state,1 6a and in Sherbert
where nearly all Seventh-day Adventists had found employment with-
out Saturday labor.', 6 The Supreme Court has granted exemption in
other cases that appear to have involved a limited potential impact on
free exercise. 1 0 On the other hand, the state requirement was elimi-
nated in Torcaso v. Watkins,10 where a religious oath for state office
potentially abridged the free exercise of all applicants for govern-
164. Substantial membership of religions burdened by a governmental program in-
dicates a great potential abridgment of free exercise.
165. Petition for Certiorari at 12, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Only 256
Amish children of school age lived in the state; only those who had completed eighth
grade without reaching age 16 were affected by the statute. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. at 246 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
166. Only two Adventists in that area had been excluded from unemployment benefits
because of inability to find non-Saturday work, while nearly 150 members of that religion
had found suitable employment. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.2 (1963). Only
1000 Adventists resided in the state; only some were of working age. Brief of Amici
Synagogue Council et al. at 12, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
167. Exemption has been the remedy in four other major Supreme Court decisions
involving free exercise. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) ("I Am" movement,
with its rather unique religious practices, from consideration of verity of its doctrines in
fraud prosecution); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, for whom publication sales is a particularly integral activity, from book agent tax
and literature license tax); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (same); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (same religion, in selling religious literature and
playing controversial recordings, from publication license and breach of peace ordinances).
In two other decisions, exemption was granted by statute while no remedy was mandated
by the free exercise clause, so widespread abridgment was not relevant to the choice of
remedy. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (from military conscription); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1963) (same). Relief from military service is a permissive
accommodation rather than a constitutional right. See, e.g., United States v. MacIntosh,
283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931); United States v. Koehn, 457 F.2d 1332, 1334 (10th Cir. 1972).
168. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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mental employment, 169 and in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,170 where a
law compelled attendance at public schools and affected all students in
religious and private schools. 17' The Court has provided similar relief
in other cases that appear to have threatened a great impact on religious
exercise.' 7
2
The potential impact on free exercise from exclusive public school
presentation of the general theory would appear to be very widespread
and substantial. More than fourteen million individuals in the nation
are adherents of religions that explicitly teach special creation, and
many other individuals attend creationist churches or hold creationist
convictions but are part of ecclesiastical organizations divided on that
doctrinal issue. 173 This, like persistent coercion, renders exemption
inadequate as a remedy.
B. Neutralization
Public school instruction found to abridge free exercise of religion
can be neutralized by incorporation of countervailing viewpoints. Just
169. Id. at 490 (law "bar[red] every person who refuses to declare a belief in God
from holding a public 'office of profit or trust' in Maryland," including positions of
school teacher and notary public).
170. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
171. Id. at 534 ("The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under considera-
tion would be destruction of appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private
primary schools for normal children within the State of Oregon."); cf. State v. Whisner,
47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 215, 351 N.E.2d 750, 770 (1976) ("'[M]inimum standards' under attack
herein effectively repose power in the state . . . to control the essential elements of
nonpublic education .... ") The Court based its decision in Pierce on the fundamental
right of parents to send their children to a religious or other private school, rather than
on the free exercise clause directly, which at that time had not been extended to the
states. 268 U.S. at 535. This holding was followed in Yoder, where the Supreme Court
implied that the result in Pierce might have a constitutional basis besides substantive
due process: "[h]owever read, the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the
rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children." 406 U.S. at 233.
This alternative foundation was elaborated in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973), where the Court stated that "a state law interfering with a parent's
right to have his child educated in a sectarian school would run afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause." Id. at 788. The parent's right to free exercise hence appears to include his
interest in the child's religious upbringing. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 182 N.W.2d
539, 542 (1971), af 'd, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
172. Elimination has been the remedy in five other decisions of the Supreme Court
in major free exercise cases. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (statute
authorizing official recognition of one church faction potentially permitted intervention
in any church dispute); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting
public worship on city streets without discretionary permit potentially threatened a
common religious exercise); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (prohibitions on
literature distribution also potentially applied to many religions); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (same); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (requirements
for literature licenses had similar potential effect).
173. See notes 21-22 supra. In addition, many of the 64 million Mormons, Roman
Catholics, and Southern Baptists affirm divine creation. See note 22 supra.
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as public school instruction from one nonreligious viewpoint may be
contrary to the tenets of some religions yet consistent with the prin-
ciples of others, alternative nonreligious perspectives may harmonize
with the tenets of the objecting faiths. For example, if a public school
philosophy course addressed the subject of the existence of God in a
nonreligious context, but considered only Kierkegaard and Aquinas
and others defending the theistic position, incorporation of Nietzsche
and Griffin and others taking the atheist position might neutralize the
course. Addition by public school authorities of one or more non-
religious theories of origin to courses that present the general theory
of evolution similarly provides one method of relief for the infringe-
ment of free exercise of creationist religions.
Approaches to removal of an abridgment of religious exercise must
not contravene the establishment clause of the First Amendment. This
provision requires substantial neutrality on the part of government
toward religions. 74 The Supreme Court has fashioned a tripartite test
to define the reach of the establishment clause and the contours of
neutrality. It forbids legislative or judicial action with a primary
effect of aid or opposition to religions, a nonsecular legislative purpose
of advancement of particular religions, or an excessive entanglement
of the state with religions.1.7 Although an overly expansive construc-
tion of the establishment clause can create conflict with the free ex-
ercise clause, 76 the establishment prohibition properly construed de-
mands only substantial neutrality, 77 and not an absolute separation or
an impenetrable wall between church and state.'78 Consequently the
174. The establishment clause requires that government must be "neutral in its rela-
tions with groups of religious believers and non-believers." Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
175. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
176. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426, 428
(1953); Note, Religious Accommodation Under Sherbert v. Verner: The Common Sense of
the Matter, 10 VILL. L. REV. 337, 341 (1965).
177. This substantial neutrality standard averts some of the tension between the
religion clauses. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) ("As a
result of this tension, [Supreme Court] cases require the State to maintain an attitude of
'neutrality.' "); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("neutrality . .. derives
from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses"); P. KAuPER,
supra note 18, at 67-79.
178. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S: 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not call for
total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense .... [T]he line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) ("The metaphor of a 'wall' or impassable barrier
between Church and State, taken too literally, may mislead constitutional analysis ....");
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) ("The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.") A
substantial neutrality standard conforms more to the purpose of the establishment clause
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 515, 1978
establishment clause does not prohibit all recognition of the nation's
theistic heritage 79 or extension of general benefits to religious as well
as secular organizations. 8 0 It does not bar neutral state action that
harmonizes with religious exercises' 8 ' or prevent objective and neutral
study about religion in public schools.' 8 2 Nor does it preclude manda-
tory accommodations of religion that alleviate abridgment of free
exercise or some permissive accommodations that avert restraint of
religious freedom, 8 3 even though these involve affirmative govern-
than does a "wall of separation" rule of absolute neutrality. See W. KATZ, supra note
136, at 91. The concept of "separation of church and state" might overextend the
establishment clause because of change in the meaning of that phrase. M. HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WVILDERNESS 5-6 (1965).
179. W. KArz, supra note 136, at 23 ("[T]he secular nature of the state need not be
enforced with rigid absolutism. . . . [H]istoric religious roots of our institutions" need
not be deracinated from "traditional civic ceremonies and literature and symbols.") The
establishment clause does not compel removal of things that acknowledge the religious
heritage of this country, as an absolute neutrality standard would demand: Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). It does not prevent reference to God on coins, in
the pledge of allegiance, in the national anthem, or in invocations of courts and legisla-
tures; it does not bar religious proclamations by the President or administration of oaths
on the Bible. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299, 303, 304 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962); Aronow v.
United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774
(D. Ariz. 1963).
180. The establishment clause permits extension of general benefits to all individuals
or organizations within a secular class, even though those benefits secondarily aid a
religion. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at
108. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (nondesignated subsidy to
nonseminary universities); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (tax exemption
for nonprofit organizations); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks in
secular subjects for schools).
181. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) ("[IT]he 'Establishment' Clause
does not ban federal or state regulation whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.") Hence a Sunday closing law,
which harmonizes with the religious practices of Sunday worshipers, does not have a
primary effect of aiding religion. Id. at 445. Criminal laws against murder, polygamy,
and theft that accord with theological tenets of many religions, do not establish religion.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961). And a provision of the Humane Slaughter
Act, for "slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or
any other religious faith that prescribes a [throat-slitting] method," does not contravene
the establishment clause. Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1286, 1292 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
419 U.S. 806 (1974).
182. The establishment clause does not forbid "teaching about religion" though it
prohibits "teaching of religion," because teaching about religion does not advance some
religions and hinder others as long as it is substantially neutral. Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Hence schools may use the Bible in literature or history classes, in presenting a secular
subject in a substantially neutral manner, "consistently with the First Amendment," id.
at 225 (opinion of the Court). Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
183. Katz, supra note 176, at 428 ("[T]he separation principle does not preclude action
to avoid restraints on religious freedom .... ) Reading the establishment clause so
broadly as to require total separation or absolute neutrality would bring that clause into
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mental action'1 4 and affect other individuals.1' 5 Although these various
state activities might have a secondary religious impact that would be
invalidated under an absolute neutrality standard, they do not have a
primary religious impact that would be overturned under the sub-
stantial neutrality standard.8 0
Presentation of biblical creation would contravene the establish-
ment clause and thus could not be employed to neutralize a public
conflict with the free exercise protection. Instead the state must make mandatory accom-
modations for religion, protection which the free exercise clause requires, and it may
make some permissive accommodations, which both religion clauses allow. Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70, 673 (1970) ("limits of permissible state accommodation to
religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (public schools may "ac-
commodate the religious needs of the people"); P. KAuPER, supra note 18, at 59. Preserva-
tion of the religious liberty of individuals placed by government in restrictive circum-
stances, such as provision of chaplains and churches at military bases and penal institu-
tions, is one type of accommodation mandated by the First Amendment. Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Remmers v.
Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afj'd, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert..denied,
419 U.S. 1012 (1974); Katz, supra note 176, at 429. Alleviation of an abridgment of free
exercise is another accommodation allowed by the establishment clause. 374 U.S. at 295,
302-03 (Brennan, J., concurring); Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552 (6th Cir.
1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). See note 226 infra.
184. Government may safeguard religious exercise through released-time programs
from public schools. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952); Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d
121, 124 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). The state may provide religious
schools on Indian reservations. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). It may preserve
free exercise through chaplains and churches in the armed forces and prisons. See note
183 supra. Government may provide for an alternative method of animal slaughter. Jones
v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 (1974). It may require ac-
commodation by employers of workers' religious exercise. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,
516 F.2d 544, 552-54 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976). See P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 17, 71, 75; Katz, supra note 176, at 429; Moore,
The Supreme Court and the Relationship between the 'Establishment' and 'Free Exercise'
Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 142, 198 (1963).
The state may alleviate abridgment of free exercise by exemption from governmental
programs, such as from compulsory education or military service or federal taxes. Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 n.22 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452-53
n.17 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); W. KATZ, supra note 136, at
20 ("not efforts to promote or establish religion, but merely to maintain neutrality").
185. These positive programs may legitimately affect individuals outside the class
accommodated, so long as their religious exercise is not abridged. The released-time
programs in Zorach and Smith caused ordinary academic instruction to cease for both
released and nonreleased students. 343 U.S. at 309; 523 F.2d at 122. An exclusion of birth
control discussion from sex education and biology classrooms affected students including
those without religious objections. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580
(E.D. Mich.), aff'd mere., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (upholding exclusion).
186. A state program with a primary religious impact advances religions more than it
furthers secular aims, and so violates the establishment clause under the reasoning of
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). A "distinctively religious means"
is necessary for an unconstitutional primary effect. P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 64. A
program with a secondary religious impact has implications for religions but still has a
primarily secular effect. See Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guar-
antees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 79 n.14, 105 n.125 (1970).
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school course.' 8 7 Teaching of religion necessarily prefers some religions
over others and lacks substantial neutrality. 88 Instruction in scientific
creationism, however, would serve to neutralize a public school course
that exclusively presents the general theory of evolution. Spokesmen
for this perspective do not seek to ban Darwin's Origin of Species or
to exclude the general theory from classrooms.18 9 Instead, their model
of scientific creationism proposes special creation of matter 90 and
life,' 9 ' postulates stability of original plant and animal kinds, 92 denies
common ancestry of human beings with apes,193 and offers catastro-
phism, the view that unique and cataclysmic events occurred in the
past, as the underlying principle of geologic history.9 4 This perspec-
tive suggests that the law of entropy, or change toward disorder, ap-
plies to the earth and living organisms, 195 and that the world and life
came into existence relatively recently. 96 Textbooks presenting scien-
tific creationism do not expound the Bible, but instead employ sci-
entific discussion, 97 and their authors are highly trained in sci-
187. Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
188. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
189. See notes 10 & 12 supra.
190. See SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM (PUBLIC SCHOOL EDITION) 17, 28 (H. Morris ed. Crea-
tion-Life Publishers 1974) [hereinafter cited as SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM] ("[M]atter and
energy . . . were specially created .... " The big-bang theory "does not account for the
initial super-dense state" which it postulates, while the steady-state theory "does not
account for the [initial] hydrogen" which it assumes.)
191. See id. at 46 (general theory requires that life arose from nonlife by present
natural processes, yet "such evolution is not occurring today"; hence evolution model
must be modified by unproved "assumption . . . that there were different [primeval]
conditions," while creation model predicts that life is not evolving currently).
192. See id. at 79 ("[M]ost of the forms of plants and animals have arisen suddenly in
the fossil record. There is no evidence that there have ever been transitional forms
between these basic kinds.")
193. See id. at 178 ("[T]here is no objective evidence that man evolved from . . .
animal ancestry." Fossils show "no intermediate or transitional forms leading up to
man.")
194. See id. at 112, 117 (Geologic history indicates "the rapid destruction and burial of
life in one age" from "waters pouring perpetually from the skies and erupting con-
timously from the earth's crust . . . until the entire globe was submerged.")
195. See id. at 38 ("creation model . . . explicitly predicts" second law of thermo-
dynamics, the tendency toward entropy or disorder, while evolution model requires
progressive change and integrative alteration that contradicts this law).
196. See id. at 136, 160 (The "creation model . . . fit[s] more naturally in a short
chronology," and "many more [natural] processes . . . give young ages [for the earth, life,
and man] than ... old ages.")
197. The primary examples of scientific creationist materials are BIOLOGY: A SEARCH
FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY (rev. ed. J.N. Moore & H. Slusher eds. Zondervan Pub. House
1974) (for secondary school students as general text); ORIGINs (R. Bliss ed. Creation-Life
Publishers 1976) (for secondary school students as supplementary text); THE SCIENCE AND
CREATION SERIES (H. Morris & J. Phelps eds. Creation-Science Research Center 1971) (for
elementary school students as supplementary texts); SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note
190 (for teachers). None of these textbooks expounds the Bible. See ORIGINS, supra at 31
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ence. 198 Neutralization through scientific creationism raises complex
questions under the establishment clause. These include whether that
theory is religious in nature, whether its presentation in public schools
would be unneutral, and whether it would infringe the rights of other
individuals. These questions can be answered through an examination
of the effect and purpose of instruction in scientific creationism. 199
1. Primary Effect
The Sixth Circuit in Daniel v. Waters200 considered the question of
instruction from Genesis in public school science classes. A state statute
required those biology textbooks used in public schools that presented
evolution to give "commensurate attention" and "equal ... emphasis"
to Genesis and "other theories" of "the origins and creation of man and
his world. ' 201 It excluded any "occult or satanical beliefs of human
origin" from the other theories that must be taught, and excepted the
Bible from the requirement of a disclaimer in each book that explana-
tions of origins are "theory" rather than "scientific fact."202 The court
("[C]onstruction of the Creation Model will be based upon scientific evidence that sup-
ports creation and flood geology."); ScIENTIFIC CREATIONISN, supra note 190, at iv ("[P]ur-
pose ... is to treat all of the more pertinent aspects of the subject of origins and to do
this solely on a scientific basis, with no references to the Bible or to religious doctrine,"
thereby "showing that the creation model of origins and history may be used to correlate
the facts of science at least as effectively as the evolution model."); Creation-Science Research
Center, How To Use the Science and Creation Series 1 (undated) ("Creation is not taught
... on the basis of Biblical or religious authority but solely as a scientific model ....
Similarly, the evolutionary theory is not opposed in the books on religious grounds, but
only because of its serious scientific deficiencies.")
198. The editor and the 23 consulting authors of Scientific Creationism include at
least 14 creationists who hold doctorate degrees from nonsectarian universities in various
fields of science; nine currently teach at nonreligious universities. See SCIENTIFIC CIRA-
TIoNiSM, supra note 190, at i-ii; Institute for Creation Research, 21 Scientists Who
Believe in Creation (1974). The sponsor of Biology: A Search for Order in Complexity
is the Creation Research Society, a scientific organization with approximately 500 members
who have advanced degrees in the natural sciences. The 19 editors and authors include
at least 12 individuals who have doctorates from nonreligious schools in science. See
BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN CoMPLEXIrrY, supra note 197, at xvi.
199. Neutralization would not bring "excessive entanglement" with religion, and so
would not contravene the third aspect of the establishment clause test. Entanglement
ordinarily is a financial question; additional financial expenditures would be small and
no subsidy of a religious organization would occur. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). Preventing
adoption of religious textbooks for biology would not require as much state supervision
as monitoring texts for all subjects in the textbook loan program sustained in Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Preventing presentation of religious views in the
biology classroom would not necessitate even the degree of oversight in insuring secular
use of sectarian college buildings financed through the construction grant programs up-
held in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), and Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
200. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975). Accord, Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1970);
Steele v. Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1975).
201. 515 F.2d at 487.
202. Id.
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found this law to violate the establishment clause in several regards.
The exclusion of occult views preferred some religions over others and
entailed excessive entanglement.200 The exception from the disclaimer
requirement gave a "preferential position for the Biblical version of
creation." 204 Although the provision for instruction from Genesis did
not draw much criticism in the opinion, except for a long quotation
without explanation from a Supreme Court opinion,20 5 it violates the
requirement for substantial neutrality because its primary effect neces-
sarily is teaching of religion.
Incorporation of scientific creationism to neutralize public school
instruction in the origin of the universe and life would not have this
primary effect of advancing some religions. Although scientific crea-
tionism does harmonize with the teachings of many faiths, the general
theory of evolution also coincides with the tenets of some other reli-
gions.206 The establishment clause does not bar instruction in a
203. Id. at 491.
204. Id. at 489.
205. Id. at 489-91 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-05, 106-07 (1968)).
The Supreme Court in Epperson invalidated a state statute that proscribed discussion of
evolution but permitted discussion of Genesis and that had been enacted for nonsecular
purposes. See pp. 566-67 infra. That case is not determinative of the issue presented in
Daniel, because the statute in Epperson did not require instruction from Genesis or
require equal time for the Bible along with evolution. 515 F.2d at 495 (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting).
206. One school of belief within Humanism regards its convictions as a religion.
Kurtz, Humanism and Religion: A Reply to the Critics of Humanist Manifesto II,
HUMANIST, Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 4. These religious Humanists ordinarily emphasize the
general theory of evolution.
The renowned Humanist Manifesto declared its purpose to be proclamation of "re-
ligious humanism." Its 15 propositions stressed the general theory of evolution:
First: Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.
Second: Humanism believes that man is a part of nature and that he has emerged
as the result of a continuous process.
Fifth: Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern
science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values.
... Religion must formulate its hopes and plans in the light of the scientific spirit
and method.
A Humanist Manifesto, NEw HUMANIST, May-June 1933, at 1, 1-2, reprinted in HUMANIST,
July-Aug. 1962, at 130, and 4 RELIGIous HUMANISM 61 (1970) (emphasis in original). The
24 original signatories included eleven ministers, a rabbi, and two seminary professors;
"all but four can be readily identified as 'religious humanists'." Wilson, The Religious
Element in Humanism Pervades Its Origin, Inspiration and Support, HUMANIST, Nov.-
Dec. 1962, at 173. See Arisian, A New Statement of Religious Humanism, HUMANIST, Mar.-
Apr. 1977, at 54; Sellars, Religious Humanism, NEW HUMANIST, May-June 1933, at 7.
Humanist Manifesto IH also emphasized the general theory. See HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct.
1973, at 4, 6. One hundred seventy of its signatories were ministers of the Unitarian-
Universalist Church, and many were members of the Fellowship of Religious Humanists.
Wilson, Pioneer of Evolutionary Humanism, HUMANIST, May-June 1975, at 40. This
Fellowship also shows a conjunction of the general theory with religious Humanism. See,
e.g., Haydon, Is Scientific Humanism Religious?, 2 RELIGOUs HUMtANISMr 49 (1968). Com-
pare Humanism, A New Religion, 2 RELIGIous HUMANISM 96 (1968) with C. POTR,
HUMANISM: A NEW RELIGION 15, 114 (1930).
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scientific and nontheological model of origins that is consistent with
religious belief in creation, however, any more than it proscribes a
model that reinforces a religious belief in the general theory. 207 Refer-
ence to a creator or designer does not contravene the establishment
clause,2 08 nor is teleological discussion excluded from public schools. 209
Moreover, the establishment provision does not prohibit use of scien-
tific material written or advocated by individuals holding strong reli-
207. Enactment of a Sunday closing law does not have a primary effect of advancing
religion, though it "happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961). Similarly, promulgation of a
requirement for accommodation of employees' religious exercises does not have an un-
constitutional primary effect. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir.
1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). See notes 181 & 186
supra.
208. Mention of God in the pledge of allegiance in public schools, and reference to
"the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation" or "'In God is our trust'" in
the national anthem, do not establish religion. See note 179 supra. Mention of a creator
may be part of objective and neutral study of a secular subject, which the establishment
clause permits, see note 182 supra, so long as description of the creator or sacred authority
is not the primary nature of the study. If the establishment clause were construed to
prohibit reference to deity, Darwin's Origin of Species could not be assigned in public
schools, because it often mentions "the Creator," and ends with the statement that
"(t]here is grandeur in this view of life ...having been originally breathed by the
Creator into a few forms." C. DARWIN, THE ORIcIN OF SPECIES 759 (Variorum ed. 1959)
(second through sixth eds.). See id. at 343, 753, 757-58. Similarly, one major high
school biology text could not be used because it quotes this same passage. BSCS BLUE,
supra note 25, at 100. If the establishment clause were construed to prohibit incidental
allusion to the creator's attributes or incidental reference to the Bible, this and another
secondary school text would be excluded through their mention of "'the Supreme and
Omnipotent Creator'" and "the flood recorded in Genesis of the Hebrew Bible." BSCS
BLUE, supra note 25, at 111; BSCS GREEN, supra note 25, at 310.
209. Some individuals have argued that reasoning from design presupposes the
existence of a designer and the supernatural, that science must exclude the supernatural
because scientific methods of observation and experimentation cannot be applied, and
thus that teleology and creation cannot enter into valid science. J.A. Moore, supra note 4,
at 186. The producer of three major textbooks asserts that creationism cannot be scientific
because it presupposes a creator. Mayer, Creationism: A Masquerade, 36 At. BIOLOGY
TCHR. 245, 246 (1974).
Scientific creationists have responded, first, that "creation is as scientific as evolution
and . .. evolution is as religious as creation," so that "belief in evolution requires at
least as much faith .. . as creation." H. Morris, supra note 12, at 1, 11. They suggest
that the general theory, to the same extent as scientific creationism, is nonobservable,
nonverifiable, and nonfalsifiable. SCiErnFlC CREATMONISM, supra note 190, at 4-8 (citing
authorities); cf. Matthews, Foreword to C. DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES at xi (1971) ("Belief
in the theory of evolution is thus exactly parallel to belief in special creation-both are
concepts which believers know to be true but neither, up to the present, has been
capable of proof.") They have replied, second, that the general theory has its own
teleology, which ascribes design to nature or natural selection much as creationism
ascribes design to a creator. Cf. Ayala, Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology,
PHILOSOPHY SC., March 1970, at 2 (Darwin "substituted a scientific teleology for a
theological one" of "natural laws manifested in natural processes").
Mandating that public schools cannot present any concept of teleology or creation would
be affirmative rejection and exclusion by the state of concepts consistent with some
religions. This might result in state unneutrality and hostility toward religion, which
would contravene the First Amendment. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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gious convictions, whether Christians and others having faith in the
Genesis account of creation 210 or nontheists giving credence to a reli-
gious variety of Humanism. 211 Just as instruction in the general theory
does not have a primary effect of aid or opposition to religion, presenta-
tion of scientific creationism does not have a primary effect that
establishes religion.2 12
It has been asserted that neutralization of the subject of origins is
impossible because any concept of creation necessarily is primarily
210. It is true that the authors of the major scientific creationist textbooks are Chris-
tians representing a variety of denominations or fellowships, and that in other places
some have written in support of biblical creation. The personal beliefs of the authors do
not render their works religious in nature, or the contents religious doctrine. The estab-
lishment clause does not ban use in public schools of literary works authored by in-
dividuals holding strong convictions about religion, whether Moby Dick by Melville or
Candide by Voltaire.
The existence of criticism of the general theory based upon nonreligious arguments
and motivations shows the absence of a primarily religious effect from the same
critique authored by a creationist. Such scientific discussion by a creationist does not
lose its secular nature by its consistency with his personal religious beliefs. One author,
without recourse to revelation or deity, has concluded that classical Darwinism is "sadly
decayed" and that neo-Darwinism has a "precarious status." N. MACBETH, DARWIN RETRIED
134, 141 (1971). An English scientist also challenges the general theory not on religious but
scientific grounds. G. KERKUT, supra note 2, at 150-57. "[T]he most distinguished of
French zoologists," Pierre P. Grass6, in L'Evolution du Vivant, launched "a frontal attack
on all kinds of 'Darwinism.'" Dobzhansky, Darwinian or "Oriented" Evolution?, 29
EVOLUTION 376 (1975). A large "silent group of students engaged in biological pursuits"
disagrees with much or all of the general theory. Olson, Morphology, Paleontology and
Evolution, in I EVOLUTION AFTER DARWIN, supra note 33, at 523 (S. Tax ed.).
211. Sir Julian Huxley, a prominent author on the subject of the general theory,
believed in a "religion of evolutionary humanism." Huxley, The Coming New Religion
of Humanism, HUMANIsT, Jan.-Feb. 1962, at 3, 5. His religion was "not based on revela-
tion in the supernatural sense, but on the revelations [of] science," id. at 5, that "all
reality is in a perfectly valid sense one universal process of evolution." Id. at 4. He
regarded the general theory of evolution as the primary element in Humanism. Huxley,
Evolutionary Humanism, HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1952, at 201, 206. He entitled the con-
cluding chapter of one book "Evolutionary Humanism as a Developed Religion." J.
HUXLEY, RELIGION WITHOUT REVELATION 203 (rev. ed. 1957). Cf. G. HIMMELFARB, DARWIN
AND THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTION 381 (1962) (Darwin wrote, as he formulated his evolu-
tionary theory, that "'disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last
complete.' ")
212. It appears unfair to characterize scientific creationism as "smuggling of religious
dogma into classrooms in a scientific Trojan horse," Mayer, supra note 209, at 246, or
as "forced imposition of religious doctrine, disguised as science, into the science text-
books." Statements by Scientists in the California Textbook Dispute, 34 AM. BIOLOGY
TCHR. 411, 415 (1972). One noncreationist author objected to this approach, writing that
"[n]or, as [creationists] are sometimes accused of doing, are they trying to put Genesis
into the biology books." Wade, supra note 10, at 725. Accord, S. Darby, Creation Con-
troversy in California 56 (Apr. 20, 1976) (unpublished B.A. thesis for Princeton University,
Dep't of Biology). Just as the general theory of evolution is neither a religious doctrine
nor religious Humanism, although many religious creationists characterize it as that,
scientific creationism is neither a religious doctrine nor Genesis in disguise, although
many proponents of the general theory including evolutionary Humanists characterize it
as that.
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religious. 2 13 A recent Indiana court decision, Hendren v. Campbell,214
found a textbook presenting both the model of scientific creationism
and the general theory of evolution to establish religion for a similar
reason. The state textbook commission had determined that the text
fairly presented two theories of origins and that its adoption did not
violate the First Amendment. 15 The plaintiffs to the suit characterized
the book as "blatently [sic] sectarian and partisan" because of "in-
herently religious and sectarian material contained throughout the
text to the objective exclusion of other biological theories respecting
human development." 210 The material allegedly was religious because
the textbook refers to a "Creator" at several places and adverts to "the
Genesis account" and "biblical creationism"; it indicates its consistency
with "Christian perspectives" and evaluates scientific creationism in
several sections as a superior explanation of observed facts.217 The
state trial court determined that the "book is replete . . . with references
to biblical topics . . .as being the only correct viewpoint to be con-
sidered";2 18 it also held that "the text consistantly [sic] presents crea-
213. One commentator argues that "creation . . .presupposes a creator the existence
of which is empirically unverifiable. Because acceptance . . .must be a matter of faith,
it is a religious doctrine the teaching of which in the public schools presents insurmount-
able obstacles under both the free exercise and establishment clauses .... LeClercq, The
Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption?, 27 VAND. L. REv. 209, 228
(1974) (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). This definition of "religious doctrine"
would exclude many subjects taught in public schools, because many matters cannot be
proved empirically and many others cannot be conclusively verified though they can he
reasonably substantiated. The general theory provides one example of such a non-
verifiable and nonobservable topic of instruction. Cf. Birch & Ehrlich, Evolutionary His-
tory and Population Biology, 214 NArURE 349, 352 (1967) ("Our theory of evolution has
become ... one which cannot be refuted by any possible observations. It is thus 'outside
of empirical science' . . . ."); Dobzhansky, On Methods of Evolutionary Biology and
Anthropology, 45 AM. ScIEx-s-r 381, 388 (1957) ("The applicability of the experimental
methods [to evolution] . . .is severely restricted before all else by the time intervals in-
volved, which far exceed the lifetime of any human experimenter.") "Matters of faith"
are not necessarily religious doctrines, and teaching unproved things is not forbidden
by the religion clauses.)
214. No. S577-0139 (Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977), excerpted in 45 U.S.L.W. 2530
(May 17, 1977).
215. Commission on Textbook Adoption, supra note 7. The commission noted that
"[t]he textbook states that neither theory is subject to scientific verification." Id. See
BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPL.XITY, supra note 197, at 470, xxii, xviii.
216. Complaint at 4, Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139 (Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14,
1977); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, id.
217. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, 4, 8-9, 10,
id. The state school superintendent described the suit as "a Scopes trial in reverse," be-
cause advocates of the general theory excluded creation from public schools much as
adherents to creation in some areas once excluded evolution. Washington Star, Feb. 16,
1977, § I, at A-6, col. 6. The situations differ, however, in that Indiana neither required
presentation of creation nor excluded discussion of the general theory.
218. Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, mem. op. at 10. The court framed the issue
as "whether a text obviously designed to present only the view of Biblical Creationism in
a favorable light is constitutionally acceptable in the public schools." Id. at 19. The
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tionism in a positive light and evolution in a negative posture. ' 219
The opinion confounds two very distinct lines of analysis under the
establishment clause. One is that the text presents a religious doctrine
of creation by discussing a creator, an act of creation, design in nature,
and a worldwide flood, which cannot be distinguished from instruction
directly out of Genesis. The other is that the book favors creation over
the general theory, and consequently lacks neutrality between non-
religious theories that harmonize or conflict with some religious
beliefs.
The superior court's characterization of the text's contents as pri-
marily religious, however, is based on insufficient evidence, 220 because
mention of a creator and design, harmony with some religions, and
assessments more often favorable to the scientific merit of creation over
the general theory are not prohibited by the establishment provision.
The doctrinally distinct concern with the biology book's partiality to
one nonreligious theory over another, moreover, is also misdirected, be-
cause scientific instruction that does not always extend equally favor-
decision never addressed the key issue, whether the textbook presents a biblical doctrine
rather than scientific creationism, and simply used the terms interchangeably. The court
took nearly all of the quotations in the opinion from the preface rather than the text
material of Biology: A Search for Order in Complexity, even though ordinarily students
would not use the former. Neither the textbook nor the teachers' guide presents "Biblical
Creationism." See note 220 infra.
219. Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, mem. op. at 6 (Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977).
The court devoted five pages to examples of nonreligious statements in the textbook that
conclude that scientific creationism corresponds with particular scientific observations
more closely than does the general theory. Id. at 5-9.
220. The book in question, Biology: A Search for Order in Complexity, contains a
relatively insignificant number of references to deity, the Bible, or similar subjects in its
622 pages of text and introductory material and its approximately 230,000 words. It
adverts only 25 times to "God"; "13 of these are found in statements that science cannot
prove the existence or study the characteristics of the supernatural, while six occur in
quotations from famous past biologists. The text does not expound the Bible; it quotes
only two phrases and one chapter citation, none from Genesis, and mentions the "Bible,"
"Genesis," or "biblical" only on 12 occasions. It refers to a "creator" only 19 times and
to Bible personages only 10 times. See BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY,
supra note 197.
The teachers' edition, which Hendren also cited, similarly is not replete with Bible
doctrine. It refers to "God" and the "Bible" each only five times (with no biblical quota-
tions) and to "Creator" only twice. See TEACHERS' GUIDE (rev. ed. 0. Fischbacher, R.
Paisley & W. Tinkle 1974) (to accompany BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN CoMPLLuTY,
supra note 197).
Probably the most controversial statement, occurring in the student book's preface rather
than its text, is the "hope" that the book "will be attractive first of all to the many
private schools directed by those seeking to maintain an educational philosophy and
methodology consistent with traditional Christian perspectives. We trust it will also be
of interest and use in public school systems . . . to develop a genuine scientific attitude
.... " BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note 197, at xxiii. This ex-
cerpt does not say that the textbook contains Christian doctrine, but that hopefully the
book will be useful to some Christian as well as public schools. On the other hand, it
does emphasize the scientific orientation of the text.
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able treatment to one theory does not contravene the First Amend-
ment. Because of these underlying analytic errors, the determination
in Hendren that scientific creationism has a religious primary effect
appears to be incorrect. Even if the decision were correct about this
particular textbook, however, a model of scientific creationism and
critique of the general theory nonetheless could be constructed from
scientific discussion of empirical evidence divorced from theological
reasoning and terminology. A textbook, moreover, very possibly could
give a dispassionate and nondogmatic treatment of this model along
with the general theory of evolution without violating the establish-
ment clause.
2. Legislative Purpose
Neutralization by means of instruction in scientific creationism also
would not necessarily have a legislative purpose of furthering religious
rather than secular concerns that would contravene the establishment
clause. The Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland221 held that
enactment of a Sunday closing law has the secular purpose of providing
a "common day of rest" and not a nonsecular purpose of aiding
religion, 222 despite the harmony of that statute with exercise of many
religions.22 3 Similarly, addition of scientific creationism to a biology
course that exclusively teaches the general theory has the secular
legislative purpose of presenting more than one nonreligious explana-
tion of the origin of the world and life. Even Clarence Darrow of
Scopes trial fame 224 remarked that it is "bigotry for public schools to
teach only one theory of origins." 225
Incorporation of that model also has the secular legislative purpose
of restoring substantial neutrality by alleviating a burden on free
exercise. 2 6 As Professor Katz argued, neither the establishment pro-
221. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
222. id. at 451-52.
223. See id. at 431-34, 442. Similarly, adoption of a national anthem including the
phrase "'In God is our trust'" had a secular legislative purpose though it harmonized
with many religions' views. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Ariz. 1963).
And addition of the words "under God" to the pledge of allegiance also did not con-
travene the establishment clause despite its consistency with sectarian belief. Smith v.
Denny, 280 F. Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Cal. 1968), appeal dismissed, 417 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.
1969). See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 440-41 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
224. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) (upholding law forbidding
presentation of evolution in public schools and requiring instruction in divine creation).
225. R. O'Bannon, Creation, Evolution and Public Education 5, Dayton Symposium
on Tennessee's Evolution Laws (May 18, 1974).
226. Justice Brennan, concurring in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
295 (1963), wrote that "nothing in the Establishment Clause forbids the application of
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vision nor the separation of church and state concept "preclude[s] ac-
tion to avoid restraints on religious freedom. ' 22 7 The state particularly
can alleviate an existing abridgment of free exercise arising from un-
neutral state action. 228 Accommodation of religious exercise can in-
volve affirmative governmental action without violating the secular
purpose requirement.229 For example, the Supreme Court in Zorach
v. Clauson230 sustained accommodation of free exercise through a
released-time program, even though that involved affirmative provision
and affected nonparticipating students as well. 231 The courts, more-
over, have upheld the constitutionality of regulations under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requiring "reasonable accommodations
to the religious needs of employees. ' 232 Thus addition of scientific
creationism, viewed in light of the state-created abridgment of free
exercise, merely restores neutrality.23
The state court in Hendren misapplied this secular purpose test. It
found the biology textbook to contravene the establishment clause be-
cause of the publisher's purpose in printing the book rather than the
legislative purpose in selecting it.234 The court did not use the pub-
legislation having purely secular ends in such a way as to alleviate burdens upon . ..
free exercise." Hence action "to prevent a public welfare program from abridging
free exercise" does not have a "purpose . . . in any way religious." Id. at 303. Provision
of a released-time program similarly has the secular purpose of "accommodation" of
parental interests and student exercises. Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). See note 183 supra.
227. Katz, supra note 176, at 428.
228. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 444, 182 N.W.2d 539, 545 (1971), aff'd sub nom.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ("The 'free exercise neutrality' may require a
state to make special provisions for religious interests in order to relieve them from both
direct and indirect burdens . . . by increased governmental regulations." (footnote
omitted)).
229. See note 184 supra.
230. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
231. Id. at 309 (ordinary academic instruction was cancelled during hour program).
232. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)
(1976). See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 716(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). This require-
ment has been upheld against attack under the establishment clause. Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552-54 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 429
U.S. 65 (1976); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375, 377 (W.D. Pa.
1975); Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1030, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
The Supreme Court did not address the establishment issue when it recently construed
this provision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
233. One article proposed that "[w]here the only interests supporting legislation are
religious or nonsecular, as in Epperson, the presumption of invalidity should be con-
clusive." LeClercq, supra note 213, at 216. Such a test for legislative purpose would
prevent legislative alleviation of any abridgment of free exercise and would perpetuate
-infringements of religious liberty, unless some group other than the burdened religious
group supported the remedial legislation.
234. The court wrote that "[c]learly, the purpose of A Search for Order in Con-
plexity is the promotion and inclusion of fundamentalist Christian doctrine in the public
schools. The publishers . .. admit that this text is designed to find its way into the
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lisher's statement merely as a basis for inference of the legislative in-
tent; rather, it assumed that the relevant intent in applying the
nonsecular purpose test was that of the publisher. Even use for an
inference would be questionable, however, unless the publisher or
writer sat on the textbook commission that approved the book. Proof
of the religious convictions of an author tells nothing about whether
his novel, philosophic essay, or science textbook is religious in nature
rather than merely consistent with his faith or whether public school
authorities adopted it for religious rather than secular purposes. 235
Instruction in scientific creationism thus conforms to the substan-
tial neutrality standard. Its religious implications and its accommoda-
tion and restoration of free exercise do not cause an unconstitutional
primary effect or a prohibited legislative purpose.
The federal district courts in Wright and Danie2 36 -were correct in
stating that "equal attention and emphasis" to all religious theories of
origins would be "patently unreasonable. '2 37 Public schools in science
class, however, may teach only those explanations of origins that are
nonreligious in nature and are presented through scientific discussion.
Those classes do not have to offer any particular scientific explanation,
and courts would not initiate such a requirement. Scientific crea-
tionism not only offers a nonreligious and scientific model of origins,
but also appears substantially consistent with the views of most
religions that object to the general theory of evolution, because its
terms generally are divorced from particular theological conceptions of
deity or sacred authority.238 Hence adoption of scientific creationism
public schools to stress Biblical Creationism." Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139, mer.
op. at 19 (Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977) (emphasis in original). It cited statements by
the publisher of the text, and by a creationist research organization and a Christian
college (which the court confused with the sponsor of the book, the Creation Research
Society), to show "the purpose" of the textbook. Id. at 4-5. The superior court provided
no other evidence as to the legislative purpose, either from textbook commission minutes
or school authorities. Its sole discussion of the legislative purpose test assessed "the
purpose of A Search for Order in Complexity."
235. Vonnegut's intent to give religious comment did not render assignment of
Slaughterhouse-Five an establishment of religion. Todd v. Rochester Community Schools,
41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972). Tolstoy's religious purpose in writing War and
Peace, or Wallace's in writing Ben Hur, would not prevent selection of those books for
public school use.
236. Daniel v. Waters, 399 F. Supp. 510, 511-12 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), on remand from
515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
237. Id. (dictum); Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208,
1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 969 (1974) (dictum).
238. See BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER iN CO iPLEXITY, supra note 197, at xvii, xxii
("There are essentially only two philosophic viewpoints of origins among modern
biologists-the doctrine of evolution and the doctrine of special creation"-" though several
variants of each have been developed.") While there are differences on some issues be-
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as a countervailing theory would not involve the impracticality of
presenting all religious doctrines of creation.
A public school course that presents both the general theory and
scientific creationism would not infringe the free exercise of non-
creationist students, though one theory would be contrary to their
viewpoint, just as it would not infringe the religious liberty of crea-
tionists. 239 Each would confront alternate nonreligious viewpoints
rather than an exclusive state-endorsed perspective on the origin of
the world and life.
Neutralization would protect individual free exercise but also would
affect governmental education interests to a greater degree than would
exemption. This method of relief would remove a substantial abridg-
ment of religious exercise, by ending the types of burdens and the
forms of coercion arising from exclusive instruction in the general
theory, and so would constitute a less burdensome means of state
regulation. However, neutralization would bring interference with
state interests in autonomy and innovation in public school biology
curricula,240 although it would not affect governmental presentation of
the general theory. Because scientific creationism would not require
any more attention than the general theory, which does not occupy a
large proportion of course hours,241 and might be introduced as a unit
tween adherents to special creation, there also are disagreements between advocates of
the general theory. Neither prevents presentation of that model of the origin of the
world and life.
239. Public schools would need to exempt any individual if presentation of scientific
creationism along with the general theory sincerely abridged free exercise of his religion.
For the same reason that a few students might find any exposure to the general theory
in conflict with their religious convictions, although it is a nonreligious concept and even
though the class is neutralized, a few others might find any exposure to scientific crea-
tionism in violation of their religious convictions, although it also is nonreligious and
neutral. Neutralization would not alleviate abridgment of religious exercise for absolute
separatists, and so they also would have to be exempted from any exposure to the
general theory. However, only a small minority of separatists are absolute separatists
(numbering only one of the creationist religions discussed in notes 21-22 supra,
Apostolic Lutherans), and exemption probably would be entirely acceptable to such
faiths. Hence interference with public school classrooms from these exemptions would
not be very significant. If a science instructor objected to presentation of scientific
creationism, a substitute teacher might be brought in to offer a unit in that model.
240. Interference with governmental interests might be minimized by neutralization in
an alternate class rather than in all biology classes. This class might present one or more
additional nonreligious concepts of the origin of the earth and life, while another existing
class might continue offering only the general theory.
241. Most biology classes devote a relatively small portion of class hours to the gen-
eral theory, although those hours are not in a block since the general theory ordinarily
pervades a great deal of the course material. Compare note 104 supra with notes 26-30
supra. Three scientific creationist textbooks suggest either that biology classes devote a
three week unit to that model or discuss it whenever the general theory is discussed.
SCIENTIFIC CArTIONISa, supra note 190, at iv-v; R. Bliss, Teachers' Guide to Origins 5-10
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rather than at many points within the course,242 neutralization would
not affect the state interest in the predominant part of the course.
C. Elimination
Removal of a topic that burdens free exercise of religion from a public
school course or removal of a similarly burdensome academic discipline
from the school curricula might alleviate an abridgment of religious
freedom. Hence elimination of the general theory of evolution from
a biology course and elimination of instruction in biology are additional
methods of relief for infringement of creationist beliefs and separatist
practices.
The state has authority to remove instruction in a particular topic
from a public school course. Exclusion of any discussion of birth con-
trol from biology and sex education courses was sustained by a federal
district court in Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education,243 and
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 244 A public school biology
teacher challenged the statute as an infringement of his First Amend-
ment rights. 245 Although the governmental action in eliminating dis-
cussion of birth control harmonized with the tenets of some religions
and affirmatively accommodated free exercise of those faiths,246 the
district court held that it did not contravene the establishment clause
and was facially valid.247
The state furthermore holds power to eliminate teaching in an
academic discipline from public school curricula. The Constitution
does not require states to institute public schools.248 Upon creating
public education government may choose not to present some areas of
(1976); H. Morris, supra note 12, at 3. Although presentation of scientific creationism may
not require the equivalent of three weeks, even that would be less than 10% of class
time, because most high school biology courses last for a full kcademic year. See L.
OsrERNDoRF & P. HORN, supra note 76, at 74, 157. Hence addition of scientific creationism
to a biology course would interfere with the state interest in less than 10% of the
course.
242. H. Morris, supra note 12, at 3, 5. Three of the four scientific creationist classroom
books are designed as supplements to existing courses, and so are easily adaptable to
presentation as a unit within a course.
243. 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
244. 419 U.S. 1081 (1975).
245. 379 F. Supp. at 584.
246. Many religions oppose sex education and particularly birth control instruction. See,
e.g., Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn.
Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (C.P. 1971).
247. 379 F. Supp. at 586, 587.
248. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); see Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
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human knowledge, and indeed must.249 After presenting a discipline
the state can decide to cease teaching it.250
The judiciary has authority to order elimination of a governmental
program or requirement that violates free exercise, although this
authority is more limited than legislative power.251 The Supreme
Court has invalidated a prescribed oath for state office 25 2 and manda-
tory attendance at public schools; 253 the judiciary has eliminated ed-
ucational standards imposed on secondary and elementary schools.2 54
Similarly, the Supreme Court eliminated under the establishment
clause public school Bible reading,255 classroom prayer,256 and a re-
leased-time program.2 57
In Epperson v. Arkansas258 the Supreme Court overturned a state
law that forbade instruction in evolution in any state-funded schools.
The statute prohibited only the evolutionary theory,259 and effectively
left Genesis as "the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of
man. ' 260 Moreover, the legislature enacted the statute for the "sole
reason" of requiring exclusive presentation in public schools of
"fundamentalist sectarian conviction."2' This violated the establish-
ment clause, which requires a primary effect of "neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion, 262 and a
249. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp at 586 ("The authorities must
choose which portions of the world's knowledge will be included in the curriculum's
programs and courses, and which portions will be left for grasping from other
sources ....")
250. Justice Black acknowledged state power to terminate public school instruction in
a field.
It is plain that a state law prohibiting all teaching of human development or
biology is constitutionally quite different from a law that compels a teacher to teach
as true only one theory of a given doctrine. It would be difficult to make a First
Amendment case out of a state law eliminating the subject of higher mathematics,
or astronomy, or biology from its curriculum.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 111 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Hence "there is no
reason ...why a State is without power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject
deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools." Id. at 113.
251. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969).
252. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
253. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
254. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
255. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
256. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
257. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
258. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
259. Id. at 99 n.3.
260. Id. at 107. See id. at 109.
261. Id. at 103, 108. Cf. id. at 107-08 (The law was not "justified by considerations of
state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens. . . . [F]undamentalist
sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence.")
262. Id. at 104. The state "must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine,
and practice," and "may not be hostile to any religion." Id. at 103-04. Justice Harlan
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legislative purpose of secular concern rather than nonsecular enactment
of "the religious views of some of its citizens." 20 3 Exclusion of evolu-
tion was unneutral because the law did not also exclude other view-
points such as biblical creation, though it did not require presenta-
tion of Genesis. 264 It was nonsecular because the statute proscribed
evolution "for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a
particular religious doctrine" that was expected still to be taught.20 5
Although the Court overturned elimination of a public school subject
in these circumstances, it specifically acknowledged governmental
power to determine academic curricula,20 and indicated the state's
authority to eliminate instruction in origins from public schools
through neutral means and a nonreligious purpose.20 7
Elimination of the general theory from a public school course would
emphasized that the neutrality concept was central in Epperson. Cf. Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 362 n.15 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (underinclusiveness of cur-
riculum proscription). See Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d 121, 122 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
263. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 107.
264. Id. at 109 ("Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality"
because the state "did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities
all discussion of the origin of man," but only to bar "a particular theory.")
265. Id. at 103 (emphasis added). See id. at 107 (state may not "prohibit . . . the
teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons
that violate the First Amendment" (emphasis added)); id. at 109 (it may not "blot out a
particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account" when that
account still may be offered (emphasis added)).
266. Id. at 105, 107.
267. The law apparently would have represented "religious neutrality" if the state
had "excise[d] from the curricula of its schools . . . all discussion of the origin of man"
on the basis of a secular purpose. Id. at 109. The concurring opinion of Justice Black
underscores the constitutionality of a law applying neutrally to all concepts of origins. Id.
at 113.
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court's opinion stated in
dictum that "the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them .... " Id. at 505. This language is occasionally cited for the
proposition that public schools cannot exclude the general theory. E.g., Wright v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per
curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); LeClercq, supra
note 213, at 216 n.46. The Burstyn case actually held that state censorship of motion
pictures abridges freedom of speech and press, 343 U.S. at 505, and did not implicate free
exercise of religion. This is why the quoted sentence continues that protection from
distasteful views is not "sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those
views." Id. The Court did not rule on other issues such as the establishment question. Id.
at 499. The case did not involve impressionable public school students in a state-created
institution, but the general public.
In Wright the district court concluded that "[tjeachers of science in the public schools
should not be expected to avoid the discussion of every scientific issue on which some
religion claims expertise." 366 F. Supp. at 1211. This misses the point. Contrariety to
religious beliefs and an unconstitutional restraint upon students' free exercise, not
scientific "expertise" claimed by the religion, provides the rationale for elimination. And
governmental abridgment of their religious liberty, not a private citizen's "discussion" of
an issue, justifies governmental alleviation of the burden.
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be constitutionally permissible, just as exclusion of birth control from
a biology class was consistent with the establishment provision, so long
as the legislative purpose was secular. Exclusion of biology from the
curricula also would be within state competence, in the same way that
a prior decision not to offer biology would stand against challenge.
Neither form of elimination would offend the constitutional rights of
teachers, 268 parents, 269 or students.27 0
Elimination would not have a legislative purpose of furthering
268. While "[i]t can hardly be argued that ... teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the state does not shed its
interest in public school curricula when the teacher enters the schoolhouse. The difference
in roles of public school and university level teachers, and the difference in maturity of
students at those levels, necessitate a less expansive degree of "academic freedom" for
secondary and elementary school instructors. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392
(D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242, 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). Thus the Supreme Court has men-
tioned the concept of academic freedom primarily at the university level. Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (citing cases); T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 598-611. And
courts have recognized greater authority of secondary and elementary schools over the
classroom presentation. Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, 229-30 (D. Md.), aff'd,
348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966); Schauer, School Books,
Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 305 (1976); Comment, The
Dwindling Rights of Teachers and the Closing Courthouse Door, 44 FORDHAMi L. REV.
511, 521-24 (1975). Consequently at these levels "nothing .. . gives a person employed to
teach the Constitutional right to teach beyond the scope of the established curriculum."
Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd inem., 419 U.S.
1081 (1974). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1968) (Black,.J., concurring);
Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
965 (1975); Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers To
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1339-49, 1355-56 (1976).
269. The Court articulated a parental interest in the education of children in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Meyer and Bartels the Supreme Court invalidated state
laws that proscribed instruction in the German language in parochial and sectarian
schools, but did not limit "the Stite's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions
which it supports." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 402. In Pierce the Court overturned a
statute that applied only to students in nonpublic schools, but did not rule on state
authority over public school curricula. See Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F.
Supp. 580, 586 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
270. A federal appellate court recently ruled that a school board's action in removing
two books from a school library abridged the students' "right to know and to receive
information." Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
It found that action arbitrary and without rational basis because the board offered no
explanation. Id. at 580, 581. This case, however, "abruptly departs from precedents in
this area" in positing a "right" that no other case recognizes for secondary school students.
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1236, 1244, 1246 (1977). Another circuit court sustained identical
school board action against a challenge based on students' First Amendment rights.
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 291-92 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). It found a rational basis for removal of the book
in its unsuitability for students of that maturity level. See id. at 291. Minarcini, more-
over, would not apply to elimination of the general theory, because it did not involve
exclusion of a topic from classroom discussion, 541 F.2d at 584, while it did recognize school
board "curriculum and textbook control" in the board's decision not to use the books
as texts, id. at 579-80.
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religious rather than secular concerns, which would contravene the
establishment clause,2 71 although as in Mercer it would harmonize with
the tenets of some religions and avert a burden on some individuals.
Prior governmental action imposed the burden on free exercise, and
elimination would alleviate this burden.27 2 Professor Kalven observed
that the state would have a rational secular basis for eliminating in-
struction of the general theory if it determined that instruction in that
theory tended to destroy religious beliefs of adolescent and pre-
adolescent students, 273 and Justice Black noted that it would have a
legitimate purpose in removing study of biology from public schools.2 74
Either course of action would differ significantly from the situation in
Epperson, because all concepts rather than just one of the origin of life
would be eliminated from public school classrooms, and reasons other
than enactment of sectarian doctrines would impel elimination of the
general theory.27 5
271. The circuit court in Wright noted that "[fqederal courts cannot . . . prevent
teaching the theory of evolution in public school for religious reasons." Wright v. Houston
Independent School Dist., 486 F.2d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969
(1974). Although this is undoubtedly true, public school authorities can exclude the
general theory for secular reasons.
One secular legislative purpose for elimination would be to avert state-sponsored
destruction of religious beliefs and violation of religious practices of adolescent and
younger students. See note 273 infra. Another such purpose would be to alleviate a
burden on free exercise. See notes 183 9- 184 supra. A final secular purpose for elimina-
tion of the general theory would be to avoid public school instruction in a false theory.
See Goldstein, supra note 268, at 136. Some noncreationists, as well as creationists, ques-
tion the validity of the general theory, see note 210 supra, and at least one noncreationist
advocates elimination of the Darwinian theory from public schools. His conclusion, on
the basis of his scientific assessment rather than religious precept, that no theory at all
is preferable to the general theory of evolution supports this secular rationale for elimina-
tion. Macbeth, A Third Position in the Textbook Controversy, 38 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR.
495 (1976).
272. Introduction of instruction in the general theory did not have a legislative purpose
or primary effect of advancing religious Humanism or other religious beliefs. For the
same reason, elimination of instruction in that concept would not advance religion; it
restores free exercise. It too has a secular purpose despite its secondary religious effect.
273. If a state "legislature reasoned thus-evolution may be an engaging scientific
theory, but, if taught prior to university level, it tends regardless of the intention of the
teacher to upset the young and to destroy their religious beliefs," and because "these
are values entitled to consideration from the legislature" it banned the teaching of
evolution at these lower educational levels-"its judgment could not be easily upset."
Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes V. State, 27 U. CHt. L. REV. 505, 517 (1960).
274. See note 250 supra.
275. Courts very rarely find establishment of religion on the basis of a nonsecular
legislative purpose. Goldstein, supra note 268, at 1310 n.57. Instead, most establishment
cases rest upon a primary effect of aid (or opposition) to religion or excessive entangle-
ment with religion. This indicates that a finding of a nonsecular purpose requires that
the predominant reason for the statute is advancement of religion, or perhaps even the
sole reason as the Court found true in Epperson. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
444-49 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws despite partially religious reason for enact-
ment). Hence a statute has a secular purpose if there is substantial nonreligious reason
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The elimination remedy might protect individual free exercise as
effectively as neutralization, countering each form of restraint and
each type of coercion, 276 but it would interfere with the governmental
curricular interest to a greater degree. Elimination would obstruct the
state concern in presentation of the general theory,277 something
which neutralization would not affect, although it might not interfere
with the governmental interest in autonomy and innovation for the
remaining parts of the course or the interest in instruction in
biology.278
Conclusion
Comparison of these alternative remedies in light of their protection
of religious liberty and impact upon state educational interests sug-
gests that the preferred remedy in secondary schools is neutralizing
instruction in the origin of the world and life or, in exceptional cir-
cumstances, exempting students from a block of classes (if the text and
instructor present the general theory only in a single unit). The pre-
ferred approach in elementary schools is neutralizing course material
or excluding the general theory. These preferred remedies would al-
leviate the unconstitutional burden on free exercise from exclusive
presentation of the general theory and counter substantial coercion
against religious liberty, and yet would avoid the greater interference
with governmental interests from elimination of biology instruction
and steer clear from the proscriptions of the establishment clause.
for its enactment, even if a legislative intent to advance religious interests is also possibly
present.
276. Removal of the general theory from biology courses would not impair the public
benefit for creationist students and would reduce its value only partially for other pupils,
whereas elimination of biology from school curricula would deprive all students of the
public benefit of instruction in that field.
277. Interference with governmental interests might be minimized by elimination of
instruction in a particular topic, the general theory, in only an alternate class. Another
existing biology class might continue presentation of the general theory.
278. Elimination of the general theory of evolution would not interfere with the rest
of a biology course, while by contrast elimination of biology itself would frustrate the
governmental interest in the entire course.
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